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ABSTRACT

ANALYSIS OF RESOURCE-SHARING DECISIONS IN DYADIC COLLABORATIVE
KNOWELDGE CREATION – A GAME THEORETIC APPROACH
By
SAVITHA KADIYALA NAMUDURI
Defended December 19th, 2005
Committee Chair:

Dr. Subhashish (Sub) Samaddar

Major Department:

Managerial Sciences

Knowledge is an asset that can give an organization competitive edge. However,
knowledge creation is an expensive activity. One of the reasons organizations form knowledge
creation collaborations is to share resources that are needed to create knowledge.
This dissertation models the dyadic collaborations as games between the partners and
arrives at resource-sharing schemes for them. Specifically, the collaborations are modeled as two
games- Stackelberg Leader-Follower game and Partnership game. The types of collaborations
are distinguished based on the nature of the marginal return functions with respect to knowledge
creation investments for each of the collaborating organizations.
Three essays are presented and discussed. In Essay 1, collaborations between
organizations characterized by decreasing marginal returns with respect to investments are
modeled as a partnership game. In Essay 2, collaborations between organizations characterized
by increasing marginal returns with respect to investments are modeled as a Stackelberg LeaderFollower game. In Essay 3, collaborations where the leader organization is characterized by
decreasing marginal returns with respect to investment and the follower organization is
characterized by increasing marginal returns with respect to investments are studied. The
solutions for the game in terms of the participation rate, knowledge creation investments, and the
system gain are presented for each essay. The results are analyzed and the observations are
stated as propositions. The propositions provide guidelines for collaborating organizations to
arrive at a resource-sharing scheme. Additionally, the results suggest conditions under which the
potential partners collaborate specifically with respect to the participation rate and the system
gain. The results of Essays 2 and 3 provide conditions for participation rate. The results of Essay
3 provide the conditions of expected system gain under which the follower organization will
collaborate with a potential leader organization. The results have implications for several stages
of the alliance management process such as partner selection, gauging the behavior of potential
and current partners, and renegotiation of alliance terms.
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Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION

1

1.1 Knowledge, Knowledge Creation and Collaborative Relationships
Knowledge is increasingly being recognized as the most important competitive asset for
organizations (Webber, 1993). The knowledge-based view of the firm (Grant, 1996; Kogut &
Zander, 1992) endorses the importance of creating, managing and using knowledge for an
organization’s competitive advantage. One of the most difficult tasks facing the field of
knowledge management today is the definition of knowledge itself. Although attempts have been
made to agree on a comprehensive definition, the inherent nature of the concept of knowledge
probably makes it difficult for researchers to arrive at a plausible definition. For instance Grant
(1996) remarks that:
“Developing knowledge-based theory of the firm raises the issue: What is knowledge?
Since this question has intrigued some of the world’s greatest thinkers from Plato to
Popper without the emergence of a clear consensus, that is not an arena in which I
choose to compete. In terms of defining knowledge, all I offer beyond the simple
tautology of ‘that which is known’ is recognition that there are many types of knowledge
relevant to the firm.” pp.110.
A definition of knowledge that originates from traditional Greek epistemology is that
knowledge is a “justified, true belief” (Nonaka, 1994). This definition calls for a belief that a
certain tenet is true and unless such belief is justified, there is no knowledge.
Alternately, Davenport and Prusak (1998) give a working definition of knowledge as
follows:
“Knowledge is a fluid mix of framed experience, values, contextual information and
expert insight that provides a framework for evaluating and incorporating new
experiences and information. It originates and is applied in the minds of knowers. In
organizations, it often becomes embedded not only in documents or repositories but also
in organizational routines, processes, practices and norms.” pp. 5.
This definition appears to encompass all the features of knowledge such as the structural
features, functional features, and where it resides within an organization. One can also gather
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that knowledge is complex, fluid and its worth is recognized to the extent that the knower puts it
to use. Hence, for the purpose of this dissertation I use Davenport and Prusak’s (1998) working
definition of knowledge.
Another method by which we can arrive at a working definition of knowledge, is by
distinguishing it from data and information (Zack, 1991). Data is a collection of objective facts
about events. The next level in the hierarchy is information, which is data with sense.
Information is believed to have impact on the judgment of the receiver with reference to a
particular event. Knowledge is further up in this hierarchy, adding experience and context to
information.
Organizations create knowledge in several ways. While some organizations acquire
knowledge from external sources, others dedicate a segment of the organization in the form of
research and development (R&D) divisions for the purpose of creating knowledge (Davenport et
al., 1998). Allocating dedicated resources for knowledge creation has been especially successful
in knowledge-intensive industries such as biotechnology, aviation, manufacturing, and
semiconductors (Mowery, 1988). Knowledge creation is an expensive activity, which might be
better achieved through collaboration (Hartley & Benington, 2000). Especially in the high
technology industries, where the innovation cycle time is shorter than in traditional
manufacturing, collaboration plays a major role in putting both of the participating organizations
in a win-win situation (Fine, 1998; Mowery, Oxley, & Silverman, 1996). This growing trend, to
form knowledge creation collaborations, especially among high technology organizations, has
been emphasized in recent literature (Boddy, Macbeth, & Wagner, 2000; Gibson & Rogers,
1994; Hagedoorn & Shakenraad, 1994; Kogut, 1988). Additionally, literature in knowledge
management emphasizes the notion that organizations might gain more from knowledge creation
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if they collaborate. For instance, Nonaka (1994) argued that inter-organizational knowledge
creation could be possible when the informal interactions between partners such as suppliers and
customers, distributors and even competitors, are formalized by forming alliances. Literature is
abundant with examples of several types of knowledge creating collaborations, ranging from the
simplest dyadic R&D collaborations to elaborate consortia, such as SEMATEC, formed within
the semi conductor industry. However, as with any collaboration, there is a concern about the
success of knowledge creation alliances. More importantly, one of the specific concerns this
dissertation addresses is with regard to how the resources, which are necessary for knowledge
creation, are shared among the partners. In other words, this dissertation studies the resource
participation decision-making process during inter-organizational knowledge creation,
specifically one that leads to the development of a viable resource-sharing strategy between the
collaborating partners. The collaborating partners could be organizations or strategic business
units of large organizations. Nevertheless, the collaboration itself is considered as a unit for the
purpose of this thesis. A detailed discussion on the unit of analysis for the study is presented in
Section 3.2.
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1.2 Theoretical Positioning and Motivation for the Study
Knowledge creation is expected to generate financial benefits (Forrest & Martin, 1990),
and its transfer to the collaboration partner within the context of a long-term, trusting
relationship can “create resources that lead to competitive advantage” (Lengnick-Hall, 1998).
With the knowledge-based view of the organization (Grant, 1996; Spender, 1996) coming to the
forefront, and the importance of information sharing in collaborations (Boddy et al., 2000), it is
evident that the goal of such collaboration is to derive financial and strategic benefits from
knowledge creation, including ownership of knowledge, which, would in turn, generate
economic rents in the future (Mowery et al., 1996). Thus, ownership of knowledge, and its
potential for financial and strategic benefits, has become a point of interest for collaborating
organizations.
In concert with this line of thought, I shall define a knowledge creation collaboration
relationship as one in which two organizations initiate and implement a knowledge creation
endeavor together and share the expense, and eventually the benefits of knowledge creation,
including the ownership of newly created knowledge, through mechanisms such as patents.
Collaborations among organizations for the purpose of knowledge creation have been the focus
of much research (Vonortas, 1991). Among others, spreading the costs and risks of innovation
(Mowery, 1988), achieving economies of scale, and allowing for higher levels of knowledge
exchange (Mowery et al., 1996) are some of the prominent reasons why organizations
collaborate. The growing importance of collaborative R&D efforts emphasizes that the level of
R&D spending can influence inter-organizational knowledge creation and transfer.
For instance, Cohen and Levinthal (1989; 1990) observed that absorptive capacity,
measured as the amount of R&D investments made by an organization, is an important
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determinant of organizational learning. Absorptive capacity refers to an organization’s ability to
recognize the value of new, external information, assimilate it, and apply it for competitive
advantage. This ability of the organization facilitates the creation, retention, and the use of
newly created knowledge. This line of research emphasizes the importance of studying financial
commitments in R&D (as a measure of absorptive capacity), which, in turn, affect knowledge
creation. Also, studies have shown that research joint ventures perform better than stand-alone
alternatives (Vonortas, 1991). Collaboration in research ventures is beneficial if the participating
organizations can achieve economies of scale and scope. However, in order to ensure the success
of the collaboration, the participating organizations must develop a viable strategy to coordinate
resource-sharing decisions.
Resource-sharing decisions in relation to knowledge-related activities have been the
focus of much recent research (Ba, Stallaert, & Whinston, 2001; Gerchak & Parlar, 1999; Hopp,
1987; Machlup, 1980; Teece, 1998).

While some attempts have been made to study

organizations’ efforts in knowledge creation activities, from the perspective of resource
allocation within an organization (Gerchak et al., 1999), studies of inter-organizational
knowledge creation analyzed as a dynamic, coordinated process are rare.
Furthermore, the long-term orientation and uncertain outcomes of knowledge creation
activities make the identification of the appropriate amount of financial commitments to be made
towards knowledge creation activities imperative. Adequate and timely allocation and sharing of
resources are critical to the success of the collaboration, since it has been shown to have a
statistically significant effect on the outcomes of the collaboration (Boddy, Macbeth, Charles, &
Fraser-Kaus, 1998). However, a lack of theoretical understanding exists of how this resourcesharing takes place.
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Literature on collaborations has documented several motivations, guided by several
theories, for the formation of alliances or collaborations. Of these, the three main theories that
pertain to this dissertation and their limitations as they relate to the current dissertation, are
discussed here. A detailed discussion of the theories is presented in Section 2.1. Transaction cost
economics (TCE) (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1985) defines a transaction as “transfer across a
technologically separable interface” (Williamson, 1985). A transaction is an event that occurs as
a part of an exchange process; and, specifically, it involves the establishment of an agreement
and the transfer of ownership rights (Nooteboom, 1999). Specifically, knowledge creation can
be viewed as a transaction that occurs within an organization, whereby a transfer of resources
within the organization that is necessary to create new knowledge. However, when gaining
access to such resources within an organization becomes expensive, the organization experiences
transaction costs. When the costs associated with accessing such resources are prohibitive, an
organization seeks partners to share the transaction costs. Since knowledge creation is an
expensive activity and when considered as a transaction, organizations are motivated to
collaborate with other organizations in order to reduce transaction costs. Thus, from a transaction
cost perspective, organizations are motivated to form alliances to reduce transaction costs
(Kumar & van Diesel, 1996).
While this is true, one of the factors that needs attention is the risk of opportunism that
the individual organizations may face from the partner (Jacobides, 2005; Wathne & Heide,
2000)- especially, when relation-specific investments are involved such as those involved in joint
knowledge creation. TCE proposes contractual agreements as safeguards against opportunism;
however, its recommendations are at a macro level.

In this light, the current work takes

importance, since it provides guidelines for developing expectations for the collaboration, and
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hence a yardstick to evaluate partners, as well as aids in working out the details of contractual
safeguards at the micro level.
Apart from sharing transaction costs, gaining access to resources that give an
organization competitive edge is another motivation for organizations to collaborate. Resource
dependency theory (RDT) (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) contends that firms collaborate in order to
gain access to competitively crucial resources that are not available within a firm. Particularly
when the resource in question is knowledge, collaborating with other organizations that have
complementary knowledge becomes all the more imperative (Reid, Bussiere, & Greenaway,
2001). In this study, I assume that the collaborating organizations have symmetric levels of
knowledge that are complementary. However, as explained in detail in Section 2.1, although
RDT prescribes inter-organizational networks as a means for an organization to gain access to
external resources, it does not delve into the detailed strategies that organizations can adopt
while engaging in collaborations (Barringer & Harrison, 2000).

The current work attempts to

address this gap by enabling organizations to devise resource-sharing strategies while engaging
in inter-organizational collaborations.
From an organizational learning theory (Levitt & March, 1988) point of view, it is
believed that alliances create opportunities for organizations to build their resources and to
develop abilities (that is, they create opportunities to learn). This, in turn, specifies the possible
accumulation of new knowledge as the primary reason why organizations collaborate. However,
it has been acknowledged in literature that the focus of the learning outcomes of interorganizational learning has been restricted to inter-partner learning or to how much each
individual organization has learned from the collaboration or to learning races. The need to
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consider the joint outcomes for the collaboration has been emphasized in recent literature
(Larsson, Bengtsson, Henriksson, & Sparks, 1998). Specifically, recent literature has emphasized
that inter-organizational collaborations not only result in knowledge transfer (which can be
equated to learning outcomes for individual organizations) (Powell, 1998; Powell, Koput, &
Smith-Doerr, 1996) but also knowledge creation (joint learning outcomes for the collaboration)
(Anand & Khanna, 2000; Kale, Dyer, & Singh, 2002). This dissertation addresses this issue by
focusing on the joint outcomes for the collaboration as a unit in addition to evaluating the
outcomes for individual organizations. Such a focus on the necessity to consider joint outcomes
has been identified in recent research and initial studies are currently being conducted to this
effect (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Larsson et al., 1998).
For instance, in the information systems literature, recent studies have identified the
importance of evaluating the performance at the network level (Straub, Rai, & Klein, 2004), in
addition to firm performance as the firm participates in a supply chain. However, organizational
learning theory is in its nascent stage as it relates to studying joint inter-organizational outcomes
from collaboration. In this regard, game theory explicitly allows one to model the payoffs for the
individual organizations, as well as for the collaborations. In short, the motivation for this study
is derived from transaction cost economics, resource-dependency theory and inter-organizational
learning perspectives; and, game-theoretic analysis is used to further our understanding of the
detailed dynamics of the collaboration that these theories fail to provide. As discussed in the
three essays of this dissertation, such analysis has implications for the various stages of forming
and maintaining the collaboration, including partner selection and renegotiation.
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Another specific issue that is addressed in this dissertation is with regard to the nature of
the marginal return functions with respect to knowledge creation investments for the
collaborating organizations. Literature on the economics of knowledge has shown how the
investments in knowledge creation always yield positive returns 1 by the way of better
performance (Machlup, 1980).

Literature bears sufficient evidence that the returns due to

knowledge investments always increase (Arthur, 1989; Arthur, 1990; Arthur, 1996; Teece,
1986). However, there are two competing views as to whether such returns increase at an
increasing rate or at a decreasing rate. For instance, according to one view, the performance due
to knowledge creation investments has an intrinsic limit (Dosi, 1988). This view also suggests
that the returns, due to knowledge creation, increase at a decreasing rate (Katila & Ahuja, 2002).
That is, returns on knowledge creation investments increase at a decreasing rate as they approach
the performance limit 2.

According to another view, returns due to knowledge creation

investments increase at an increasing rate3 (Knight, 1999; Knott, Bryce, & Posen, 2003; Teece,
1998). These two views are discussed in greater detail in Section 2.2. For the purpose of this
dissertation, both of these views of the performance function are considered. Such consideration
leads to the possibility that the performance due to knowledge creation investments, for each of
the collaborating organizations, could increase either at an increasing rate or at a decreasing rate.
This, in turn, arouses one’s interest in understanding the influence of the nature of
marginal return function with respect to knowledge creation investments of each firm, on the
resource-sharing decisions that are made within knowledge creation collaboration.

This

dissertation attempts to understand the dynamics underlying the resource-sharing decision1

The returns discussed in this dissertation refer to the return on R&D investments. The performance that is
discussed in this dissertation refers to the output that is achieved as a result of the R&D investment.
2
That is, the marginal returns with respect to knowledge creation investments decrease.
3
That is, the marginal returns with respect to knowledge creation investments increase.
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making process in inter-organizational collaborations, while considering the several
combinations of firms characterized by different performance functions.
The main research questions guiding this work are as follows:
What are the factors that determine an organization’s share of resources required
for collaborative knowledge creation, and how do they affect resource-sharing?
What are the conditions under which some of the potential partners become more
attractive than others?
What is the set of resource-sharing conditions in which knowledge creation
collaborations exist?
How does the nature of an individual firm’s performance with respect to
knowledge creation investment, influence the resource-sharing decisions?
These research questions can lead to insights about partner selection and how the partner
organizations can renegotiate their share of resources after forming the alliance. The specific
resource-sharing is measured by the “participation rate” of the organizations in the current efforts
toward knowledge creation. It is this participation rate which guides the choice of each partner
for collaborative knowledge creation. The current study focuses on investigating the resourcesharing conditions, identifying the factors that influence the determination of resource-sharing,
and the effect that the nature of performance due to knowledge creation investments has on the
resource-sharing decision and is therefore descriptive of the resource-sharing decision-making
process. On the other hand, the current study has implications for practice – specifically for
partner selection and incremental knowledge creation investments – and, is therefore a
prescriptive study. Recent research has called for such partnership between descriptive and
prescriptive research (Margolis & Walsh, 2003).
Both of the participating organizations may or may not have, and, consequently, may or
may not bring unique prior knowledge to the collaboration that is directly relevant to the
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knowledge creation endeavor at hand.

In the event that one or both of the individual

organizations bring unique prior knowledge to the collaboration, knowledge transfer during the
knowledge creation process is inevitable. However, it has been observed in prior literature that
large asymmetries in the partners’ unique prior knowledge are detrimental to knowledge
creation, since a considerable amount of time is spent in educating the partner with lesser unique
prior knowledge (Hitt, Dacin, Levitas, Arregle, & Borza, 2000).

Hence, I concentrate on

partners with symmetric levels of unique prior knowledge.
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1.3 Scope of the Study

The current dissertation attempts to study dyadic collaborations between organizations
for the purpose of knowledge creation. Other types of collaborations, including licensing
arrangements between partnering firms, mergers and acquisitions, and marketing and distribution
alliances, are out of the scope of this study. Additionally, the multiparty alliances, such as those
among several partners in a supply chain, are out of the scope of this study and are good
candidates for extending this study in the future.
This study also assumes that the collaboration creates knowledge and generates financial
outcomes from the created knowledge. Hence, for the purposes of this study, I assume that there
will be positive financial gains to the individual organizations, as well as for the collaboration.
In other words, collaborations that have failed and/or do not expect financial gains are out of the
scope of this study and are reserved for future work. Why collaborations continue to invest in
knowledge creation when there are negative returns needs to be further investigated. The current
dissertation, in this respect, is descriptive of how to anticipate the behavior of the individual
organizations in the collaboration. It is also prescriptive of how to share resources and benefits
of collaboration and assumes that there are benefits arising out of the collaboration.
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Chapter 2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

14

2.1 Collaborative Knowledge Creation
Knowledge creation has been defined from several vantage points in the literature
(Davenport et al., 1998; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995; von Krogh, Ichijo, & Nonaka, 2000), and
these perspectives can be broadly classified into two views - the “increase in stock view” and the
“process view.” Davenport and Prusak (1998), who are the main proponents of the increase in
stock view,

define “conscious and intentional” knowledge creation as the initiatives and

activities that firms undertake to increase their stock of corporate knowledge.
This definition projects the view of the knowledge creation process as resulting in an
increase in the knowledge stock, similar to a product, which accrues over repeated efforts of
knowledge creation. This view suggests that each knowledge creation endeavor either creates
new knowledge, or adds to the existing stock of corporate knowledge. Fundamentally then, it
assumes some measure of knowledge stock and lends itself to the existence of a measurable
return function (which is used in this dissertation), capable of capturing the benefits to the
organizations involved. Since the main return on knowledge is achieved by its use, the effects of
such use can be measured through performance, earnings, or patents, which then become(s) the
yardstick to judge the value of the created knowledge (Machlup, 1980).
The new knowledge created could add to the existing stock in two ways, by recognizing
“promising areas of inquiry” and “blind alleys.” These two types of knowledge have been
identified as positive knowledge and negative knowledge (Teece, 1998), respectively. Positive
knowledge is the knowledge created previously, which is based on past successes and provides
direction about what works. On the other hand, negative knowledge is the knowledge about
failures and what does not work. Negative knowledge is positive in the sense that it can still
guide current research efforts by steering it away from potential pitfalls.
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Thus far I have expanded on the increase in stock view of knowledge creation, and now I
turn to the process view. This view, advocated by Nonaka (1995), defines knowledge creation as
a process, or a relationship:
“By organizational knowledge creation we mean the capability of a company as
a whole to create new knowledge, disseminate it throughout the organization, and
embody it in products, services and systems.” (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995 pp. 3)
This definition projects knowledge creation as a dynamic and interactive process that
focuses on the relationships between creators of new knowledge. This view of knowledge
creation complements and extends the earlier definition of the knowledge creation process as that
which results in an increase in knowledge stock.
Nonaka (1994) presented a framework for knowledge creation based on two dimensions
of knowledge. One is the epistemological dimension, which distinguishes tacit knowledge from
explicit knowledge, and defines knowledge creation as the conversion of tacit knowledge into
explicit knowledge and vice-versa. The other dimension is the ontological, which recognizes
knowledge creation as a result of an exchange process of ideas and resources among various
organizational units such as individuals and divisions, as well as extra-organizational entities that
form a network.
In particular, the ontological dimension of the knowledge creation process could be better
illustrated by the collaborative actions taken by organizations, as in the case of Honda’s
collaboration with its suppliers ICV and JFC for manufacturing the cup-holder (Choi & Hong,
2002). Honda’s own R&D takes on the role of the individual that creates knowledge, which then
shapes the processes that need to be in place in order to implement the design. In the next stage,
once the product and process specifications are identified, Honda then partners with JFC, which
has a patent for the material that is best suited to make cup-holders. Here Honda makes a
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“knowledge” connection with potential suppliers and then chooses one that has previously
created complementary knowledge. Honda’s choice of suppliers with such complementary
knowledge defines their supply chain design and exemplifies the knowledge creation process
between different organizations.
Both the “increase in stock view” and the “process view” of knowledge creation are
useful to my work since I am interested not only in examining the output of the knowledge
creation process (in terms of a measurable response), but also in studying the dynamics of interorganizational knowledge creation (in particular, the resource-sharing decisions). Thus, the
increase in stock and process views of knowledge creation, complement each other.
As noted in the introduction, knowledge creation is an expensive activity that requires
varied expertise.

In the ensuing paragraphs, three major theories that contribute to the

underlying motivations to form knowledge creation collaborations are discussed, culminating in
the applicability of game theory to help better understand the dynamics of collaborative
relationships.
According to TCE, a firm is considered as a governance structure that enables
transactions among entities.

The transactional dimensions of TCE are asset specificity,

frequency of transactions, and uncertainty, while the behavioral assumptions underlying TCE are
bounded rationality, opportunism and risk neutrality.

Of these, asset specificity and

opportunism are discussed in this dissertation because they have a direct bearing on how the
collaboration arrives at contractual safeguards in order to reduce opportunism. Organizations
can either produce their own assets or acquire them through transactions. The extent to which an
asset is specified to an entity or process, by which characteristic it cannot be transferred to
another process, entity, or location without prohibitive costs, is called asset specificity. Asset
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specificity is of six types: (1) site specificity, (2) physical asset specificity, (3) human asset
specificity, (4) brand name capital, (5) dedicated assets, and (6) temporal specificity. In relation
to knowledge creation, Choudhury and Sampler (1997) have identified another type of
specificity called information specificity, which refers to the extent that the cost of transferring
and acquiring information from the environment is prohibitive. Information specificity, in turn,
is comprised of knowledge specificity and time specificity.
Costs associated with the creation or transfer of the assets and in general with running an
economic system, are transaction costs (Williamson, 1985). In relation to inter-organizational
knowledge creation, transaction costs include the costs associated with creating the knowledge;
using expertise that is needed to develop new knowledge, available within both of the
organizations; and the costs that are associated with monitoring the relationship with the
partners. Organizations choose governance structures that reduce transaction costs. In relation
to this dissertation, the governance structure in place is a collaborative relationship, a hybrid
form of governance structure.
Apart from transaction costs, partners’ behavioral uncertainties give rise to risks of
opportunism where one of the organizations seeks to gain advantage at the expense of its partner.
Monitoring the relationship becomes necessary to reduce any risks of opportunism by either of
the partnering organizations. Such risk of opportunism is reduced by laying certain safeguards in
place in the form of contractual arrangements.
TCE prescribes several types of contracts.

Classical contracts are those where the

contractual details are very rigidly defined. The neoclassical contracts are at the other end of the
continuum and are characterized by loosely-defined terms that leave room for flexibility.
Neoclassical contracts are typically long-term and adequately accommodate uncertainty. These
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are amenable to third-party arbitrations. Such contracts describe innovation-related contracts in
the United States (Bolton & Malmrose, 1994); and for the purpose of this study, I assume that
the collaborating organizations design neoclassical contracts with room for the renegotiation of
terms. Another type of contract is known as a relational contract. This type considers the entire
transaction as a relationship. Such contracts are self enforcing, and do not allow for third party
arbitrations. Such contracts are descriptive of innovation-relation contracts in Japan (Bolton et
al., 1994).
For instance, considering knowledge as an asset, organizations are motivated to
collaborate in an attempt to gain access to knowledge specified to a partner organization at less
than prohibitive costs. Thus, they enter into contractual agreements in order to arrive at
appropriate safeguards and terms of access to the specified asset. This is true for collaborations
where either or both of the partners have unique prior knowledge that they can contribute to the
current collaboration. However, in collaborations where the partners do not possess unique prior
knowledge, knowledge is very lowly specified; and hence, the partners might depend on loose
contractual agreements to begin with, and then plan to redraft contracts subsequently as
knowledge may become specified to either organization.
Although TCE identifies several types of contracts, when it comes to deciding on the
details of the contract, game theory is helpful. Game theory has been used by researchers in
marketing and R&D literature streams to arrive at resource-sharing decisions (Amaldoss, Meyer,
Raju, & Rapoport, 2000; Baiman & Rajan, 2002; Vonortas, 1991) and is an appropriate tool that
can be used to bridge the gap between macro and micro levels (Krishnan & Ulrich, 2001).
Furthermore, a recognized limitation of transaction cost economics is its focus on minimizing
transaction cost, thereby driving efficiency (Ghoshal & Moran, 1996).
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As Coase (1988) notes:
“I consider that one of the main weaknesses of my article ... (is that) it gives an
incomplete picture of the nature of the firm… I believe it misdirects our
attention… The way in which I presented my ideas has, I believe, led to or
encouraged an undue emphasis on the role of the firm as a purchaser of the
services of factors of production and on the choice of the contractual
arrangements which it makes with them. As a consequence of this concentration,
on the firm as a purchaser of the inputs of its users, economists have tended to
neglect the main activity of a firm, running a business.” pp.37.
In relation to knowledge creation alliances, application of TCE, and hence the focus on
minimizing cost, diverts attention from the main objective of the collaboration - creating value in
terms of new knowledge. A focus on minimizing transaction costs leads to what is referred to as
static efficiency (Ghoshal et al., 1996), the refinement of existing processes, thereby ignoring
dynamic efficiency, the creation of new processes. Dynamic efficiencies have been recognized
as important for innovation (Ghoshal et al., 1996). On the other hand, the focus of game theory
is value maximization - either in terms of payoffs for the individual organization or for the
system as a whole. Such focus of value maximization has been recognized as an important
objective that knowledge-creating collaborations require to focus on, in addition to the cost
minimization objective (Dyer, 1997). Thus the application of game theory to the resourcesharing phenomenon is expected to complement TCE by focusing on value maximization, in
addition to cost minimization.
Furthermore, critics have noted that the leading economic theories of boundaries of a firm
pay no attention to organizational knowledge (Holmstrom & Roberts, 1998). In fact, in response
to the above critique, Williamson (2002) conceded that:
“… the roles of organizational knowledge and learning… are the ones with which
transaction cost economics deals with in only a limited way. This does not,
however, mean that transaction cost economics does not or cannot relate to these
issues. I would observe in this connection that transaction cost economics made
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early provision for firm-specific learning by doing and for tacit knowledge and
that the organization of knowledge projects that differ in their needs for
coordination are even now being examined in governance structure respects. Still,
the study of these and other issues to which Holmstrom and Roberts refer are
usefully examined from several lenses, of which the lens of transaction cost
economics is only one.” pp.190 .
While TCE is useful in explaining the relationships that are defined by specific supplydemand conditions, resource dependence theory (RDT), on the other hand, is helpful in
describing the strategies organizations adopt for change and survival (Tillquist, King, & Woo,
2002). RDT specifies that organizations form alliances in order to gain access to resources that
are not available within (complementary resources). RDT proposes several inter-organizational
structures that come into place in order to enable an organization to gain access to external
resources.

Joint ventures and networks of organizations are illustrations of such inter-

organizational structures (Pfeffer et al., 1978). However, once the organization gains access to
such resources, it seeks to reduce the dependency in order to balance power in the relationship.
Thus, an organization needs to devise strategies in order to manage dependency. Although RDT
recognizes the need to devise strategies to manage dependencies, it falls short in explaining the
details about how to devise such strategies. In other words, RDT fails to explain how to
determine the optimal set of resources that are required to derive economic rent or economic
value (Hemphill & Vonortas, 2003). Game theory aids in this regard by identifying the optimal
set of resources and participation rate that maximize whatever the collaboration’s goal isindividual gain in case of leader-follower games or system gain in case of partnership games.
As noted earlier, RDT models an organization as one capable of adapting to the
environment in order to gain access to or acquire resources that are essential for its survival
(Pfeffer et al., 1978). During the course of gaining access to resources, organizations develop
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dependencies with their partners. Such dependencies between the partnering organizations may
be unilateral or mutual. In cases where there is mutual dependency, there is exchange of
resources, and the partnering organizations adopt different structures to manage the dependencies
appropriately so that resources are exchanged efficiently.
Cases with unilateral dependencies give rise to asymmetric relationships.

The

organization in the powerful position tries to obtain favorable payoffs or favorable conditions in
the relationship. Such differences in dependencies call for different coordination mechanisms
that will allow the organization to change its behavior. However, it is also possible that
organizations change their dependencies based on changes in their goals and behavior (Tillquist
et al., 2002).

RDT does not account for such changes in an organization’s dependencies. In

relation to collaborative knowledge creation, due to the uncertainties involved in creating new
knowledge, there is a possibility that the goals and behavior of the partnering organizations
might change as the relationship unfolds. Such change in goals and behavior, in turn, might lead
to a change in the dependencies between the collaborating organizations. Since RDT does not
explain the changes in organizational dependencies, game theory is relied on in order to
understand the dynamics that change the behavior of organizations as the relationship unfolds.
In short, RDT premises that a firm needs to interface with other organizations in the
environment in order to obtain the necessary resources. However, RDT falls short in explaining
what strategies organizations adopt in order to interface with other organizations, specifically, as
Barringer and Harrison (2000) note:
“The theory focuses on the need for critical resources and the necessity for social
exchange, rather than the more complex theoretical challenge of describing …
how inter-firm transfers of competencies actually take place.”
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While TCE stipulates reduction in transaction costs, and RDT stipulates gaining access to
resources external to the organization as motivations for forming alliances, organizational
learning theory specifies the intent to learn from potential partners as a motivation to form
alliances. Learning theory has developed with its roots in the behavioral model of organizations
and considers learning as one of the actions that organizations undertake in order to adapt to
changing environments (Simon, 1991). Organizations devise rules, procedures, and routines in
response to external shocks and which are more or less likely to be adopted according to whether
they have positive consequences for the organization (Cyert & March, 1963). In other words,
organizations learn the responses that would make them more adaptable to changing
environments. Alliance formation is one such response to adapt to a changing environment.
Apart from providing a motivation for the formation of alliances, organizational learning
theory also informs this study by linking accumulation of knowledge to changes in performance.
In relation to group learning (learning among groups of organizations), Argote and colleagues
(2003b) noted that group learning manifests itself through changes in knowledge and
performance. Such changes in performance would eventually lead to revenue-generating tactics
for the group under consideration. Thus, according to organizational learning theory,
collaboration is one of the ways by which organizations adapt to changing environments, and
accumulate knowledge through learning which results in performance consequences for the
organizations (Huber, 1991). Recent literature in inter-organizational learning has highlighted the
need to study inter-organizational outcomes for the collaboration, as a whole, in addition to
focusing on learning outcomes for individual organizations (Larsson et al., 1998). Although
attempts have been made or are being made to study the learning outcomes for the collaboration,
such attempts are in the preliminary stages, with most studies still focusing on learning outcomes
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for individual organizations. The current study acknowledges the need to study the outcomes for
the collaborating unit and contributes in this direction. By applying game theoretic analysis, the
current study attempts to quantify the performance consequences and returns for the
collaboration as well as for the individual organizations. In turn, the current study has benefited
from organizational learning theory in terms of formulating the revenue functions. Table 1
summarizes the theoretical background for the current work.
Theory

Transaction
cost
economics

Resource
dependence
theory

Learning
theory

Motivation to form
alliance

Gap in literature

Advantage of applying
game theory

Choosing a governance
structure (alliance) that
best reduces transaction
costs.
Contractual agreements
are a way to enforce
safeguards against
opportunism.

Focus on cost
minimization thereby
diverting from the goal of
profit maximization.
Dynamics of how to
arrive at details of
contracts.

Gaining access to
resources that are
available in the
environment in which the
organization operates.
Dependencies shape
behavior.

Changes in goals or
behaviors might change
dependencies- These are
not explained.

Explicitly models the value to
individual organizations and
for the dyad while modeling
the costs as well.
Provides guidance to member
behavior according to the
moves of the game and thus
aids in arriving at terms of
initial and subsequent
contracts.
Provides insights about the
changes in behavior and how
such changes might alter
dependencies.

Joint ventures and
networks are interorganizational structures
that allow for external
access of critical
resources.
Response to changing
environment.

Specifics details about
how inter-firm transfer of
resources takes place are
not explained.

Equilibrium values are
computed in order to arrive at
resource-sharing schemes.

There is a need for
studying interorganizational outcomes
of performance in
addition to organizational
outcomes.

Inter-organizational and
organizational learning
outcomes are quantified in
terms of profits.

Table 1: Summary of Theories Relevant to the Current Study
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2.2 Nature of Marginal Returns with Respect to Knowledge Creation
Investments
Recall from Chapter 1 that the investment made toward the creation of knowledge (a) is
expected to result in performance (P). This performance, in turn, translates into return on
investment (R). Consider the following illustration to clarify the terms “performance” and
“return”. Acme, Inc., is a manufacturing firm that produces parts for automobiles. In the recent
past, it has noticed an error rate of 10 parts per million. In an effort to reduce the error rate,
Acme Inc. has invested in investigating errors and in devising ways to reduce the error rate to 4
parts per million. Let this investment be a. At the end of the project, the reduction in the error
rate, due to the knowledge created by investing $a is the performance.

The cost savings for

Acme, Inc., as a result of the reduction in error rate is the return.
As noted earlier in the introduction, investments in knowledge creation always yield
increasing returns (Arthur, 1989; Arthur, 1990; Arthur, 1996; Teece, 1986).

Subsequent

literature has indicated that the returns from knowledge accumulate over time, regardless of the
nature of the knowledge produced- positive or negative (Teece, 1998). For instance, according
to the stock view of knowledge creation, which was discussed in Section 2.1 newly created
knowledge adds to an organization’s existing stock (Davenport et al., 1998; Teece, 1998), and its
subsequent use does not deplete the stock of knowledge (Stephan, 1996). Thus, there is enough
evidence that the returns to investments in knowledge creation always increase. However, the
returns themselves could increase at either an increasing rate or a decreasing rate. That is, the
marginal returns with respect to knowledge creation investments (henceforth referred to as
marginal returns) can either increase or decrease.
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2.2.1 Decreasing Marginal Returns Curve: Old Economy View
Literature on traditional learning curve, and other streams, has established the
relationship between hours of labor per output and cumulative learning as a case of diminishing
marginal returns (Epple, Argote, & Devadas, 1991). Furthermore, it is recognized that the rate of
acquisition of knowledge decreases as the accumulation of knowledge stock increases (Epple et
al., 1991). Thus, in relation to the amount of efforts expended in the knowledge creation
endeavor, literature endorses diminishing returns on the cost expended on learning (Gaimon &
Burgess, 2003). Additionally, it has been observed that during the product development life
cycle, knowledge has more value when it is “new” than it does in later stages (Dorroh, Gulledge,
& Womer, 1994). While knowledge creation increases the stock of existing knowledge, the
increase in the performance of the organizations, due to increased knowledge stock, slows down
as more efforts are expended in the same endeavor, similar to the notion of a learning curve
(Argote, 1999).
Specific to accumulation of knowledge, Dosi (1988) noted that a knowledge trajectory
has an intrinsic limit on its performance. When this performance limit is reached, benefits due to
new knowledge, accumulated by focusing on the same knowledge element, increase at a
decreasing rate (Katila et al., 2002) . That is, if an organization builds upon the same element of
knowledge, as the knowledge accumulation trajectory progresses, the firm will experience
diminishing marginal returns. This line of inquiry attests the presence of a performance
asymptote for benefits due to knowledge and the decreasing rate at which benefits due to new
knowledge increase. Furthermore, it also suggests that the rate of return on investments in
making incremental contributions to the same knowledge element diminish with investment.
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Hence, one can conclude that the performance function for knowledge creation is non-linear and
exhibits decreasing marginal returns.
According to this view, a firm’s return function is specified as R = α − xa −γ .

Such

specification of return function is similar to the sales response volume function prevalent in
marketing literature. From the Introduction and from the beginning of Section 2.2, we know that

R always increases with an increase in a and

∂R
= γxa −(γ +1) is always positive. This is possible
∂a

only when γ is positive. However, knowledge, as with most intangible assets, is characterized by
decreasing marginal costs over production of subsequent units (Sanchez, 1994), or in other
words, by economies of scale. This decrease in the costs for producing subsequent units, and
hence the increase in incremental output, is captured by the nature of the marginal return

⎛ ∂R ⎞
function with respect to investment ⎜ ⎟ . For firms whose marginal returns decrease, the sign
⎝ ∂a ⎠
of the second partial derivative the marginal return function with respect to knowledge creation
⎞
⎛ ∂R 2
investment ⎜⎜ 2 = −(γ + 1)γxa −(γ + 2 ) ⎟⎟ , is negative. Since γ is always positive, the second partial
⎠
⎝∂ a

derivative of the return function is always negative, which means that the marginal returns with
respect to knowledge creation investments always decrease for all positive values of γ. For firms
with decreasing marginal returns, the return function is thus specified as R = α − xa −γ .

2.2.2 Increasing Marginal Returns Curve: New Economy View
Alternately, work in the economics of knowledge considers knowledge as an intangible
asset and characterizes production functions of knowledge assets as increasing in marginal
returns (Arthur, 1989; Arthur, 1990; Arthur, 1996; Knott et al., 2003; Teece, 1998). For
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instance, Teece (1998) and Arthur (1996) suggest that the marginal returns on intangible assets
increase. They further observed, independently, that knowledge assets yield increasing marginal
returns due to factors such as the development of dominant compatibility standards, high
switching costs for customers, and negligible amount of investments to make copies of a
developed technology such as a piece of software code. Echoing the increasing marginal returns
view, Knott et al. (2003) modeled the production function for intangible assets as a CobbDouglas function with knowledge, labor, capital and industry spill-over [common knowledge
within industry] as independent variables. Hence, this stream of literature identifies the presence
of firms whose marginal returns with respect to knowledge investments increase at an increasing
rate.
According to the increasing marginal returns view, performance (P) due to knowledge
creation investments (a) is of the form P (a ) = a γ , where γ is the performance to investment
sensitivity of knowledge creation investment 4. This performance translates into return on the
investment for the firm (Machlup, 1980) given by R = xa γ . The return function is similar to the
Cobb-Douglas production function (Fraser, 2002)
investment in knowledge creation.

5

but with a single factor of production-

Relevant to the current dissertation, the Cobb-Douglas

function can be written as Q = ALβ1 K β 2 a γ where a and γ are as described above. Now the return
function could be specified as R = PQ = PALβ1 K β 2 a γ , where P is proportionality constant. A
further simplification of the return function yields the following: R = xa γ where x = PALβ1 K β 2 .

4

Performance to investment sensitivity of investment is a measure of sensitivity of the performance to investment.

5

Cobb-Douglas production function is of the form

Q = ALβ1 K β 2 where Q is the output, L is labor and K is the

capital. This production function was originally set up as a constant return to scale function with A,
constants.

β 1 and β 2

as
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The rate of return on the investment toward creation of knowledge (a) is referred to as

⎛ ∂R
⎞
= γxa γ −1 ⎟ . Literature on the
marginal return with respect to knowledge creation investment 6 ⎜
⎝ ∂a
⎠
nature of return functions supports the notion that the return on investments (R) in intangible
assets increases (Arthur, 1989; Arthur, 1990; Arthur, 1996; Teece, 1998). This implies that the
marginal return is positive. For the marginal return function to be positive, γ must be positive.
The nature of the marginal return function is explained by the second partial derivative of
⎞
⎛ ∂2R
the return function ⎜⎜ 2 = (γ − 1)γa γ −2 ⎟⎟ . When the second partial derivative is negative, the
⎠
⎝ ∂a

marginal returns decrease. This is possible only when γ is between 0 and 1. When the second
partial derivative is positive, the marginal returns increase. This is possible when γ is greater than
1. In reference to the current dissertation, each firm in the collaboration is characterized by a
different revenue function. For a firm that is characterized by increasing marginal returns, the
return function is specified as above and γ is greater than 1. As detailed in the ensuing subsections, the nature of the marginal return function for each of the collaborating partners is
expected to influence the resource-sharing schemes devised by the collaboration.

2.2.3 Knowledge Production Function: S-Shaped Curve
Thus, the old economy and new economy view of knowledge have offered alternate
explanations regarding the nature of the marginal return with respect to the investments curve.
Integrating knowledge of the dichotomous literature on the nature of the marginal returns curve,
one would speculate whether there is an underlying function that explains how some firms are
characterized by increasing marginal returns and others are characterized by decreasing marginal
6

Henceforth notated for short as marginal returns.
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returns. Literature on s-curves helps one argue that depending on the type of innovations it
engages in, a firm’s production function can be characterized by either increasing or decreasing
marginal returns. For instance, a firm that engages in radical innovations typically encounters
emerging technologies; and its production function is characterized by increasing marginal
returns. On the other hand, a firm engaging in incremental innovations typically uses mature
technologies, and its production function is characterized by decreasing marginal returns. Hence
the nature of knowledge production function depends on the type of knowledge that is being
created through radical innovation or incremental innovation.
Such functions have been the focus of much traditional research in production
economics. In particular, Hall et al. (1986), Adams (1990), and Griliches (1984) have explored
the relation between R&D investments and productivity growth. For instance, Adams (1990)
modeled the relationship between stocks of knowledge and output of the firms as a CobbDouglas production function. A similar convention was used by Griliches (1984) to formulate
the R&D productivity function. More recently, Knott et al. (2003) have followed suit while
formulating a time-dependent model of intangible asset accumulation.
The origins of the discussion on the nature of the marginal returns curve can be traced to
the classic economic literature on s-shaped growth curves (Griliches, 1957). For instance,
Hotelling (1932) noted that the sales of a new commodity, based on an invention, do not grow
for some time because the old methods still prevail in several regions at several levels. Thus the
change to the new commodity takes place slowly at first, then more rapidly, and then slows down
toward the completion of the change.
Similar to the above discussion, Brown (1991) argued that innovations in technologies
follow the s-curve. Specifically he showed that the performance improvement per cumulative
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R&D expenditure follows an s-curve with emerging technologies at the base of the curve,
developed technologies at the middle of the curve, and mature technologies at the top of the
curve, as shown in Figure 1. Note that at the base of the curve, the returns due to investments in
knowledge creation actually decrease until the firm can realize any performance improvement
due to the knowledge produced. This part of the curve that is characterized by negative marginal
returns represents the “little learning” from Alexander Pope’s (1711) quotation, “A little learning
is a dangerous thing.”

Mature
technology
Performance improvement

Developing technology

Emerging technology

Cumulative R&D expenditure

Figure 1: Performance Improvement per Cumulative R&D Expenditure Adopted from
Brown (1991).

Organization theorists have observed that newer firms are capable of expanding into new
areas of knowledge creation better than older firms (Sorensen & Stuart, 2000). Thus the return
function for a firm’s investment in knowledge creation can be construed to be dependent on the
age of the firm. Newer, entrepreneurial firms typically engage in radical innovations that yield
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increasing marginal returns, and older firms typically engage in incremental innovations
resulting in decreasing marginal returns.

Additionally, organization theory and innovation

streams of literature have established the relationship between firm size and incremental
investments. Larger firms typically tend to invest in incremental innovations while smaller,
entrepreneurial firms tend to invest in radical innovations (Chandy & Tellis, 2000). Although it
is possible to specify the return functions for individual firms as derived from the same
underlying production function, for the purpose of this dissertation, the return functions for firms
characterized by increasing and decreasing marginal returns are specified differently as noted in
Section 1.2.
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Chapter 3 METHODOLOGY
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3.1 Game Theory
This dissertation applies game theory as a method to analyze the resource-sharing
decision-making process during collaborative knowledge creation.

Game theory has been

recognized as a valid tool for analyzing transactions involving two or more parties.

The

resource-sharing decisions made by each organization within a dyadic collaboration can be better
understood if viewed as a game between two players. Although I recognize that games can be
categorized in several ways, for the purpose of this dissertation, based on the interaction between
the players, games are classified as cooperative or non-cooperative. The goal of a cooperative
game is to maximize the system gain, while the goal of a non-cooperative game is to maximize
the individual gains of the players. In order to understand the dynamics of the decision-making
process in cooperative games, especially in dyadic relationships, studying the partnership game
is appropriate (Eliashberg & Winkler, 1981; Nash, 1950, 1953).
In partnership games, both of the collaborating organizations share the common interest
of maximizing the expected system gain, however, they attempt to achieve this goal by not
sacrificing their individual gains. During this process, they negotiate over how much each firm
should contribute toward the total efforts that are required for the current knowledge creation
project. It is during these negotiations where opportunism by collaborating organizations is
manifested. Partnership game models have been widely applied in various areas of business to
study risk-sharing phenomena (Eliashberg, 1986; Eliashberg et al., 1981; Huang, Li, & Mahajan,
2002; Huang & Li, 2001). Partnership-based arrangements have been recognized to be the most
common and useful alliance structures for knowledge creation alliances such as new product
development alliances (Millson & Raj, 1996). They are useful because of their unstructured
nature and because they allow for flexibility, which has been recognized as important for
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knowledge creation (Zollo, Reuer, & Singh, 2002). As I show later, an organization’s share of
contribution depends on i) its risk tolerance, and ii) its bargaining power in relation to the
partner.
In order to understand the dynamics of the decision-making process in non-cooperative games,
studying Stackelberg’s leader-follower game is helpful (Scherer, 1996). The goal of each player in this
game is to maximize its expected individual gain, as opposed to the goal in cooperative games, which is
to maximize the expected system gain.
In leader-follower games, the leader is the organization with a more powerful position in
the decision-making process and the one which has the potential to enforce its strategy on the
other. The follower, on the other hand, is the organization that reacts to the leader’s decision
(Charnes, Huang, & Mahajan, 1995; Mesak & Mayyasi, 1995). Thus, a leader-follower game is
played in two stages. In the first stage the leader makes a move, and in the second stage the
follower reacts to the leader’s move. Specifically, the leader organization decides on its share of
the current knowledge creation effort that maximizes its individual gain. On the other hand, the
follower organization determines the amount of current knowledge creation effort that
maximizes its own individual gain. The individual players’ opportunism is manifested in these
two stages of the game. Typically, the organization that has more market power and/or is bigger
in size within a dyad assumes the position of a leader. In collaborative knowledge creation
context, I refer to the leader as the organization that has more decision-making power or
experience in the domain specific area of knowledge creation.
The importance of leader-follower relationships in collaborative knowledge creation is
evidenced by failures such as the MDF100 venture between McDonnell Douglas of USA and
Fokker of Netherlands. One of the reasons for the failure of this dyadic collaboration has been
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identified as the lack of a technologically and financially “senior” organization taking control of
the collaboration (Mowery, 1988).
If the collaborating organizations have unique prior knowledge relevant to the knowledge
creation endeavor at hand, some knowledge transfer during the knowledge creation process is
inevitable. In such situations, the relative strength of an organization’s unique prior knowledge
could put that organization in the role of a leader or that of a follower. In the specific case where
the leader organization enjoys more power by virtue of its unique prior knowledge, the leaderfollower game is similar to the concept of strategic learning in which organizations take on the
roles of teacher and student during knowledge transfer (Camerer & Ho, 2001; Lane & Lubatkin,
1998). The leader organization is analogous to the teacher, and the follower organization is
analogous to the student. This model has been widely applied in areas such as advertising
(Huang et al., 2002; Huang et al., 2001), supply chain interactions (Ertek & Griffin, 2002;
Gerchak et al., 1999), distribution (Iyer & Villas-Boas, 2003), and decision-making (Cao &
Leung, 2002).
In this dissertation, I model combinations of the nature of marginal return function with
respect to knowledge creation investments and the type of games. In Chapter 4, I present the
game theoretic analysis of the resource-sharing decision-making process as a partnership game,
with the performance function of both of the organizations in the knowledge creation
collaboration being characterized by increasing marginal returns (Essay 1). In the subsequent
Chapters (5 and 6), I present the game-theoretic analysis of the resource-sharing decision-making
process as a leader-follower game with a case where both of firms are characterized by
increasing marginal returns (Essay 2) and with a mixed case, where the leader organization has
decreasing and the follower has increasing marginal returns (Essay 3). The return functions are
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incorporated in the gain functions for each individual organization and for the system as a whole.
Specifically, the gain functions are specified as returns, less the investment, for each of the
partners and for the system.
One issue that needs to be addressed while applying the game theoretic analysis is the
universality of the assumptions of game theory. For instance, in both of the games applied in this
dissertation, it is assumed that both players in the collaboration act rationally and that they have
complete and perfect information about their partner’s preferences and potential strategy. Such
game-theoretic assumptions are very specific to the type of games used to model the
collaborations in this dissertation. For instance, if the rationality does not hold true, and if there
is a reason to believe that the players can behave irrationally, the current method of modeling
cannot explain such behaviors. In such cases, the models need to explicitly incorporate the
biases (Wade-Benzoni et al., 2002) to include the presence of such irrationality, as suggested by
the behavioral economics literature, or model the relationship where actors operate with bounded
rationality (Aumann, 1997). Similarly, another instance where the players in collaboration may
not behave rationally is the case where the partners have a high level of trust (Gulati, 1995a)
between them, owing to prior association, or due to information about the trustworthiness of a
potential partner, gathered from informal networks (Ring & Van de Ven, 1989).
Similarly, the game-theoretic assumptions of complete and perfect information are not
universal since they may not hold up well in several business situations. Organizations in a
collaborative relationship may act with incomplete or imperfect information, either by choice,
because they are not willing to share some information with potential partners, or due to
ignorance. The games used in this dissertation do not account for imperfect and incomplete
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information and, hence, are not applicable to relationships where such characteristics are
suspected to be present.
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3.2 Unit of Analysis
Several theories have established several organizational entities as units of analysis.
Units of analysis among collaborations include a broad spectrum including individuals, groups
(Chen & Edgington, 2005), divisions, strategic business units (Houston, Walker, Hutt, &
Reingen, 2001), organizations, inter-organizational collaborations such as supply chains (Hardy,
Phillips, & Lawrence, 2003; Hoang & Rothaermal, 2005), industries (Schilling & Steensma,
2001), countries, and functional entities such as contracts, or transactions (Ghosh & John, 2005),
and organizational practices (Levina & Vaast, 2005). Dansereau and colleagues (1999) have
conducted a longitudinal study on the levels of analysis employed in several studies. They
acknowledge the several levels of analysis are currently prevalent and also contend that the
levels of analysis change over a period of time. Some theories that are useful in studying
collaborative relationships are discussed here from their units of analysis point of view.
For instance, transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1985) considers the transaction as
a unit of analysis. Such an approach has been followed by researchers studying collaborations at
the contractual level, transaction level, or other functional levels of analysis. However, the
necessity to expand the scope of unit of analysis, beyond single transactions, has been
emphasized as a way to arrive at composite governance structures that might be more amenable
for collaborations (Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997).

This necessity stems from the fact that

transaction cost economics views each transaction as an independent exchange between the
partners (Rindfleisch et al., 1997).
However, a collaborative relationship seldom comprises a single transaction (Sahlins,
1972).

Transaction cost economics, is limited in accommodating the series of interrelated

transactions that occur in a collaborative knowledge creation relationship. Thus, considering a
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single transaction as a unit of analysis is inadequate for such a study. The fact that the term
transaction itself is ill-defined (Williamson, 2002) makes it difficult for researchers to consider
transaction as a unit of analysis. Instead, the appropriate unit of analysis would be one that
encompasses the series of transactions between the interacting units of the collaboration.

Theory
Unit(s) of Analysis
Transaction Cost Transaction
Economics

Support to the current study
Very less- since it does not consider the series of
transactions that occur in collaboration as
dependent.
Partial- only to relations where the partners are
unequal (principal-agent relations).
Supports.

Agency Theory

Contract

Relational view

Collaborative
relation (dyad)
Single organization; Supports.
Dyad
Organization set
Supports only if the organization set consists of
the dyad. Usually more applicable for network of
organizations.
System (consisting Supports.
of the players)

Learning theory
Resource
dependency
Theory
Game theory

Table 2: Summary of Units of Analysis According to Several Theories

Similarly, agency theory considers the contract between an agent and the principal as the
unit of analysis (Eisenhardt, 1989). However, the origin of agency theory is the relationship
between the principal and the agent. In particular, behavior-oriented contracts become units of
analysis in agency theory based studies. The principal is the entity that delegates work to the
agent. This relationship suggests the presence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the
contracting units. While such a relationship might be true among most, collaborations between
equal partners who join for the purpose of knowledge creation (as is the case with those
discussed in Essay 1 of this dissertation) are not unusual but are not included under the umbrella
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of agency theory. Hence, an extension of the unit of analysis to include relations between both
equal and unequal partners becomes necessary.
On the other hand, relational view considers the relation between collaborating entities as
units of analysis (Dyer, 1997; Dyer et al., 1998). Specifically in line with knowledge creation,
where the generation of rents can be attributed to processes that span organizational boundaries,
inter-organizational dyads have been identified as viable units of analysis. This stream of
literature is applicable to the current study since game theory also considers the collaboration
between organizations as a unit. Such a consideration is in line with the organizational learning
literature, which emphasizes the need for studying the inter-organizational entities as units of
analysis (Hoang et al., 2005; Larsson et al., 1998; Rosenkopf & Almeida, 2003).
Resource dependency theory (Evans, 1966; Pfeffer et al., 1978), which is relevant to the
study of inter-organizational collaborations, specifies the organizational set as the unit of
analysis. According to resource dependency theory, organizations form collaborations in order
to gain access to valuable resources that are external to the organizations. Such external sources
of valuable resources consist of a set of firms, which, according to resource dependency theory,
is a viable unit of analysis. In relation to this dissertation, the organization set - albeit that of two
organizations- is an applicable unit of analysis.
Similarly, according to game theory, the unit of analysis is the system comprised of the
players in a game. In relation to this dissertation, the relationship between the organizations in a
dyadic collaboration, with interaction between the collaborators, becomes a point of interest. For
studying such interactive relationships, game theory presents a viable unit of analysis where the
gains to the system (collaboration) and the iterative interactions (or moves) between the
collaborators (players) are modeled explicitly in the payoff functions of each game.
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In line with the game-theoretic view, the unit of analysis for the current dissertation is the
dyad of collaborating organizations. Such an aggregated unit of analysis, at the network level,
has been the focus of recent research and is gaining importance with more studies focusing on
areas such as supply chain management (Straub et al., 2004). When both of the organizations are
small in size, the return function is specified for the whole firm. However, when either or both of
the organizations are large, then it is possible that each of the profit-making units, or strategic
business units (SBUs) in the organization, is characterized by its own return function. In such
cases, the unit of analysis for this study would be the collaboration between the SBUs of large
organizations. If one of the partnering firms is comparable in size to the SBU of its counterpart,
then the collaboration consists of the SBU of the larger firm and whole of the smaller firm. Such
a consideration of SBU as a viable unit of analysis has been documented in innovation literature
(Berthon, Hulbert, & Pitt, 1999).
In the game-theoretic analysis that is used in this dissertation, the system return is a
linear aggregate of the individual organizations’ returns.

Consequently, the expected gain

function for the collaboration is aggregated as the sum of the expected gains of each individual
organization in the collaboration. System gain is the gain that the collaboration appropriates due
to investment in knowledge creation. The partnering organizations appropriate a portion of the
aggregate system gain, based on their gains to performance ratios that act as weights to
determine an organization’s share of the system gain. Such methods of linear aggregation and
weighted linear aggregation have been used in prior research especially in the marketing
literature (Fisher, Solow, & Kearl, 1977; Johnson & Selnes, 2004) and in much recent
information systems literature (Rai, Patnayakuni, & Patnayakuni, Forthcoming). For instance, in
relation to cooperative advertising within manufacturer and retailer dyads, Huang and colleagues
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(2002; 2001) have aggregated the system profit function as an additive of the profit functions of
the manufacturer and retailer. Additionally, Johnson and Selnes (2004) have proposed the
customer portfolio lifetime value as an aggregate of the weighted share of the value attributed to
different types of customers. In much more current work in information systems literature, Rai
and colleagues (Forthcoming) have developed a measure of firm performance by linearly
aggregating three distinct dimensions: operations excellence, revenue growth and customer
relationships. Although the dimension used in this dissertation is revenue growth, the revenue
growth for the dyad is aggregated linearly across the collaborating organizations.
In relation to this dissertation, in collaborations where both of the firms are characterized
by decreasing marginal returns, the system also exhibits decreasing marginal returns.

In

collaborations where both of the firms are characterized by increasing marginal returns, the
system return function also exhibits increasing marginal returns.
In collaborations where one of the firms is characterized by decreasing marginal returns,
and the partner firm is characterized by increasing marginal returns, the nature of the system
return function depends on the value of γ. If γ is between 0 and 1, the system return function is
characterized by decreasing marginal returns. If γ is equal to 1, then the system return function is
characterized by constant marginal returns, and if γ is greater than 1, the system return function
is characterized by decreasing marginal returns.
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3.3 Background Work
As mentioned in Section 2.2, considering the nature of the performance function for a firm,
there are four possible cases for how collaborations may be formed. Collaborations can be
formed between organizations under the non-cooperative game structure such as in the leaderfollower game. Examples include Case 1 collaborations where both of the firms have decreasing
marginal returns; Case 2 where both of the firms have increasing marginal returns; Case 3 where
the leader firm has decreasing marginal returns and the follower firm has increasing marginal
returns; and Case 4 where the follower firm has decreasing marginal returns and the leader firm
has increasing marginal returns.
Collaborations formed under the cooperative game structure, for instance, partnership game,
can belong to one of the following three cases: Case 5 where both of the organizations are
characterized by decreasing marginal returns; Case 6 where both of the firms are characterized
by increasing marginal returns; and Case 7 where one of the organizations is characterized by
increasing marginal returns and the other is characterized by increasing marginal returns. The
current dissertation addresses Case 5 in Essay 1, Case 2 in Essay 2 and Case 3 in Essay 3. The
ensuing paragraphs establish motivation for studying these three cases.
Recall from Section 2.2 that there is consensus within the literature that the performance
function on knowledge creation investments is an increasing returns function.

However,

considerable ambiguity exists with regards to whether these returns increase at an increasing rate
or a decreasing rate - old economy view and new economy view mentioned in Section 2.2.
There is sufficient reason to believe that the nature of the marginal return function with respect
to knowledge creation investments depends on the type of innovation that is underway.
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The above cases draw one’s attention because they can be evidenced in the practitioner
world, and any theoretical guidance as to the explanation of the decision-making process within
such collaborations is relevant. For instance, consider Case 5, which is the subject of Essay 1.
Here, both of the organizations are characterized by decreasing marginal returns with respect to
knowledge creation investment. Both of the organizations in this collaboration are expected to
be involved in creating knowledge that builds on old knowledge (incremental innovation) and
use mature technology. Also, typically such firms are expected to be incumbent firms that have
been recognized as experts in the industry by virtue of the knowledge that they already possess.
Given the recognized pitfall of incumbent firms that they are unwilling to make commitments in
technology (Day & Schoemaker, 2000), it makes the study of the dynamics that unfold when
two such organizations collaborate worthy of study.

For instance, since both of the

organizations in this case are unwilling to make commitments, it sparks ones interest to see how
they determine the optimal levels of current knowledge creation effort and what factors take
precedence while arriving at such levels. For instance, incumbent firms are more likely to have
a base of unimitable resources that give the competitive advantage (Mathews, 2002), and it is
known that the resource base of a firm shapes its alliance decisions (Gulati, 1995b). Hence Case
5 becomes an interesting candidate for study.
Essay 2 studies the Case 2 mentioned in the beginning of this section, with both of the
collaborating firms characterized by increasing marginal returns.

Such collaborations are

illustrative of organizations involved in radical innovations and engaging in emerging
technologies. Entrepreneurial firms are illustrations of firms engaging in radical innovations
and using emerging technologies. Literature bears evidence that entrepreneurial firms are risk
takers (George, Zahra, & Wilkund, 2005); and hence, the strategies that they develop during the
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course of a collaboration may be guided by such preference to take risks. Yet, when two such
firms collaborate, and specifically when one of them is in a dominant position as in Case 2
mentioned above, it is interesting to see how the preferences of each of the firms determine their
participation rate and the investment they make in the current project.

This would, in turn,

arouse one’s interest in determining what strategies each firm would adopt in the partner
selection and in other stages of alliance formation and maintenance.
Essay 3 concerns collaborations between the leader organization, characterized by
decreasing marginal returns, and the follower organization, characterized by increasing marginal
returns (Case 3 from above). The leader firm in this case is an incumbent firm and the follower
firm is an entrepreneurial firm. The leader firm typically engages in incremental innovation and
is involved with mature technologies. The follower firm typically engages in radical innovation
and is involved with emerging technologies. Such collaborations then would witness complex
dynamics with a potential for a clash of each organization’s preferences during the relationship.
This would, in turn, spur interest to examine the strategies that the firms would adopt in order to
make resource-sharing decisions. Additionally, it would be interesting to observe the factors
that would be important to each of the organizations in the collaboration while making such
decisions.
Case 4 is characterized by collaborations which are the opposite of Case 3 where the
incumbent firm takes the place of the follower position and the entrepreneurial firm takes a
dominant position. Although examples of such collaborations may be rare, it is still conceivable
that an entrepreneurial organization plays a dominant role, owing to its conversance with
emerging technologies and having potential for engaging in breakthrough research. An
incumbent firm, on the other hand, might benefit from such propensity of the entrepreneurial
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firm to engage in radical innovations and still maximize its own gain by leveraging its wellestablished commercialization channels. Although the current dissertation does not model such
collaborations, it would be an interesting direction for future work.
Contrasting Case 5 and Case 2, one would anticipate the types of decisions made by
Case 5 to be very different from those made by Case 2 collaborations. For instance, Case 2
collaborations might be more prone to making investments in infrastructure necessary for
developing breakthrough knowledge, such as investments in new machinery. On the other hand,
firms engaged in Case 5 collaborations could be more prone to investing in making
modifications to existing infrastructure to create an environment more amenable to create
incremental knowledge. Hence, the business decisions made by the firms belonging to both
types of collaborations are expected to be different. Such disparity in the decisions made, as well
as the decision-making process, sparks interest as to how the dynamics unfold when firms
characterized by different performance functions collaborate.
Similarly, one would anticipate that the effect of the leader organization being
characterized by decreasing marginal returns in Case 3 collaboration would be different from
that in Case 2 collaboration. For instance, Case 2 collaboration consists of two entrepreneurial
firms, while in the Case 3 collaboration the firm in a dominant position is an incumbent firm. As
explained earlier, the decisions that an incumbent firm makes regarding resource commitments
are markedly different from that of an entrepreneurial firm. Hence, one can anticipate that the
Case 3 collaborations witness more complex dynamics than Case 2 collaborations specially
because the collaborating, firms may have different preferences for certain types of investments.
The resource-sharing decision-making process has been modeled as a Stackelberg
leader-follower game in my prior related work (Samaddar & Kadiyala, 2006).

In particular,
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Case 1 as noted above was modeled. Essay 1 models Case 5 as a partnership game. This differs
from the background work in the type of game for which the relationship is modeled. Note that
the collaborating firms in background work and essay 1 are characterized by decreasing
marginal returns. The relationship is modeled as a leader-follower game in the background
work, where each organization maximizes its individual expected gain (Case 1 from above). In
essay 1, the relationship is modeled as a partnership game, where the collaborating organizations
maximize the expected system gain (Case 5 from above).
In the background work, two scenarios of collaborative knowledge creation were
presented, depending on the type of efforts that were being expended for the knowledge creation
endeavor. Scenario 1 modeled collaborations with only current knowledge creation efforts, and
Scenario 2 modeled collaborations with prior knowledge creation efforts, in addition to current
knowledge creation effort. It was observed that in Scenario 1, the leader’s participation rate is a
function of the ratio of both organizations’ gain to performance ratios. Specifically, this ratio
must be greater than 1, plus the performance to investment sensitivity of the current knowledge
creation efforts, in order for the leader organization to continue participating in the
collaboration. In addition, it was observed that the follower organization has more to gain by
collaborative knowledge creation activities than by individual knowledge creation activities.
Furthermore, it was observed that the greater the leader’s participation rate, the greater the
current knowledge creation efforts. In Scenario 2, an observation of the equilibrium values for
the current knowledge creation effort and the total expected system gain are now a function of
prior knowledge creation efforts, in addition to the ratio of the gain to performance ratios and
performance to investment sensitivity.
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We compared the equilibrium values of current knowledge creation efforts, the leader’s
participation rate and the expected system gain under both scenarios. It was found that while the
amount of optimal current knowledge creation efforts is lower when both of the organizations in
the collaboration have already made prior knowledge creation efforts, the leader organization’s
participation rate remains the same, regardless of whether the two organizations have prior
knowledge creation efforts or not. Also, the expected system gain is higher when there is a
combination of current and prior knowledge creation efforts. The conditions under which the
leader and follower make an independent decision to collaborate and subsequently stay in the
collaboration were identified; and finally, the importance of maintaining adequate gain to
performance ratio for the relationship to continue was recognized.
1

a1 * = [γ (ρ L − ρ F γ )]γ +1
t1 * =

ρ F (γ + 1) − ρ L
ρ
when F > γ + 1
ρFγ − ρL
ρL
−γ

π 1 * = (ρ L + ρ F )⎡⎢α − (γ (ρ L − ρ F γ ))γ +1 ⎤⎥ − (γ (ρ L − ρ F γ ))γ +1
⎣

1

⎦

Table 3: Equilibrium Values for the Leader-Follower Game - Case 1
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Chapter 4 ESSAY 1: PARTNERSHIP-BASED COLLABORATIVE
KNOWLEDGE CREATION- CASE OF BOTH FIRMS WITH
DECREASING MARGINAL RETURNS
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4.1 Partnership Game, Risk Tolerance and Bargaining Power
As mentioned in Section 3, it is appropriate to model the decision-making process as a
partnership game, due to the flexibility that partnership games allow for, and due to the fact that
the goal of the game is to maximize the system gain. However, as noted earlier, in order for the
players to not sacrifice their interest in individual gains, the partners negotiate with respect to the
participation rate. Thus, the balance of power in the collaborative relationship, with respect to
the decision-making process, is a key to its understanding and success. An organization can
enjoy more power than its current or potential partner by virtue of its economic resources, as
well as other resources, including prior knowledge. This might define an organization’s risk
tolerance as well as its bargaining power in relation to those of its partner. Sitkin and Weingart
(1995) define risk tolerance as an “individual’s current tendency to take or to avoid risks,”
meaning that an individual could have low risk tolerance or a high risk tolerance. They have also
identified risk tolerance as a causal antecedent to risk behavior. A high risk tolerance leads to a
risk taking behavior, and vice versa.

In relation to inter-organizational relationships, an

organization’s risk tolerance leads to its risk behavior.
An organization’s risk tolerance is an issue of concern for researchers studying
collaborations (Di Mauro & Maffioletti, 2004; Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003). For instance,
Das and Teng (1996) have concluded that an organization’s perception of the riskiness of the
collaboration determines the type of governance structure that is adopted. In essence, the
uncertainties associated with collaboration could be sources of risk for the involved parties. For
instance, when there is uncertainty related to the performance of the collaboration, then there is
performance risk; and when there is uncertainty about the partners’ behavior with one another,
there is a relational risk (Das et al., 1996). In a cooperative game, since both of the partnering
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organizations cooperate with each other, I assume that there is little relational risk; and thus
performance risk becomes a source of uncertainty, which needs to be reduced. An individual
organization’s risk tolerance determines the measures that are adopted to reduce this uncertainty,
or in other words to “mitigate the risk.” Thus the risk tolerance of an organization determines its
behavior, and hence its utility function, in the current collaboration. However, the relation
between an organization’s risk tolerance and its participation rate has not been explored
adequately in prior literature. It remains to be seen how the risk tolerance of an organization
drives the organization to behave in a certain way or the other, which is addressed in this essay.
Specifically, it would be interesting to note what effect the organization’s risk tolerance has on
its participation rate.
Another factor that has been shown to have a bearing on an organization’s behavior in
collaboration is its bargaining power in relation to its current or potential partner (Gerwin, 2004;
Inkpen & Beamish, 1997; Yan & Gray, 1994).

Bargaining power has been defined as a

“bargainer’s ability to favorably change the ‘bargaining set’ to win accommodations from the
other party and to influence the outcome of a negotiation” (Yan et al., 1994). An organization
can enjoy such power over its potential partner by virtue of its stakes in the negotiation and by
virtue of the alternatives available to the organization. Researchers studying various forms of
alliances have noted the relation between how much control an organization has in a relationship
and its bargaining power (Yan et al., 1994). Such control manifests itself with respect to the
organization’s utility function, as well as, the extent to which the profits are shared by the
partnering organizations. For instance, in a study of new product development (NPD) alliances,
Gerwin (2004) found that the share of profits appropriated by an organization in an alliance
depends on its bargaining power. However, not many studies have focused on the relation
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between an organization’s bargaining power and the participation rate in the current knowledge
creation efforts. This study attempts to address this gap in literature.

4.1.1 The Partnership Model and Analysis

In a collaborative relationship, the efforts toward knowledge creation could be of two
types: current or prior, which includes the prior knowledge base (Cohen et al., 1990). The
current knowledge creation efforts consist of resources expended on the specific knowledge
creation endeavor or alliance, while the prior knowledge creation efforts consist of resources
expended by individual organizations before they formed the alliance on efforts that are directly
relevant to the current knowledge creation project. Such prior efforts might include
infrastructural and human resources, as well as, unique prior knowledge generated as the result
of prior efforts. Unique prior knowledge could be measured in terms of the number of patents
and publications (Agarwal & Henderson, 2002; Liebeskind, Oliver, Zucker, & Brewer, 1996;
Shane, 2000; Teece, 1998). Thus current and unique prior knowledge creation efforts are the
components of absorptive capacity, which, in turn, has a bearing on an organization’s knowledge
creation (Cohen et al., 1990).
The optimal sharing of resources is explored under two scenarios. Scenario 1 is where
the collaborating organizations do not have any unique prior knowledge creation efforts or
unique prior knowledge relevant to the knowledge creation project in focus; and the only
resource that is allocated to the knowledge creation activity is the current knowledge creation
effort. In other words, both organizations start the knowledge creation process from scratch. In
Scenario 2, the collaborating organizations have made prior efforts and have, as a consequence,
unique prior knowledge, in addition to their current knowledge creation efforts. In this section,
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the optimal levels of current knowledge creation efforts and the optimal participation rate under
both scenarios are examined and compared. The following sub-sections provide examples of
both scenarios and propose mathematical models to arrive at sets of equilibrium values.

54

4.2 Scenario 1: Alliances between Organizations with No Prior Efforts
Instances of fairly recently formed organizations collaborating with each other illustrate
this scenario well.

Organizations that do not have considerable experience in creating

knowledge are good examples of organizations without any prior investments in knowledge.
Such organizations, which have not made substantial investments in knowledge creation or
innovation have been shown to be better innovators in terms of producing the output than larger
firms with substantial prior investments (Acs & Audretsch, 1987, 1988, 1990, 1991; Freeman,
1982; Patel & Pavitt, 1995; Schmookler, 1966).
The collaboration between MobilePro Corporation and Global Defense Corpoation
(GDC) (Anonymous, 2004) is an example of the alliance between two recently-established
organizations that could be reflecting Scenario 1. MobilePro Corporation was incorporated in
the year 2000 and specializes in creating scalable and global wireless technologies and
applications (Anonymous, 2004). Similarly, GDC was founded in 2003, and its focus was to
bring advanced technologies to the defense and intelligence communities to help maintain the
United States' technological lead in the areas of homeland security and global defense. The
collaboration between MobilePro and GDC was established for the joint development of secure
wireless applications for the defense industries. As is typical of firms with no prior investments
in knowledge creation activities, the intent of this collaboration was to pool expertise that was
available within both organizations to develop new applications.

However, neither of the

organizations had made any prior investments in the area of wireless security.
The response function quantifies the combined performance of both organizations in the
dyad as a result of using the knowledge created by collaboration. Performance of a knowledge
creating dyad is defined as the amount of output produced as a result of a specific mixture of
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inputs. The main inputs that are referenced in this dissertation are financial inputs such as R&D
investments. Patents, on the other hand, have been identified as valid indicators of the output or
performance of a knowledge creation activity (Hall et al. 1986). Recall from Section 2.2 that the
addition of newly-created knowledge to an organization’s existing stock, and hence its
consequent use, does not deplete it (Stephan, 1996). Also, during a product development life
cycle, knowledge has more value when it is “new” than it does in later stages (Dorroh et al.,
1994). Hence, the performance function for knowledge creation is non-linear.
New knowledge can be either positive or negative (Teece, 1998). Positive knowledge
has been identified as adding to the existing stock of knowledge (Polanyi, 1967; Teece, 1998).
However, one could argue that negative knowledge could be an important product of unique
prior knowledge that either of the collaborating organizations might contribute to the current
endeavor. Therefore negative knowledge itself might be a positive contribution from either
organization in the form of unique prior knowledge. Thus knowledge is additive and leads to
non-decreasing performance function.

Since the investments expended in developing new

knowledge can be measured in terms of performance (Machlup, 1980), the addition and
application of new knowledge would lead to better performance. This is another reason why the
performance function could be construed to be a non-decreasing function. Theoretically, one
could argue that the return on knowledge does not decrease with time, although the gain to
performance ratio from old knowledge might decrease with the decrease in the relevance of old
knowledge.
The performance function for the collaboration P (a) is affected by the current
knowledge creation efforts in the project by both of the organizations, which is denoted by a.
(See Appendix A for a complete list of symbols and their descriptions). The performance P (a )
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reaches a saturation point α as a increases. α is called the performance saturation asymptote,
which is the theoretical maximum of performance due to knowledge creation. The performance
function can be expressed as:
P (a ) = α − a −γ + ε

(1)

where α and γ are positive constants and ε represents the environmental uncertainty (random
error). Assuming that the expected value of ε is zero, the expected performance function Pˆ (a )

is:

Pˆ (a) = α − a −γ

(2)

The expected performance is maximized as the current efforts are maximized. The
parameter γ is called the “performance to investment sensitivity”. The higher the value of γ, the
greater is the influence of current knowledge creation efforts a on expected performance Pˆ (a ) .
Also, it is assumed that the values of γ are the same for both of the collaborating firms.

4.2.1 Gain Functions and Equilibrium Values

Let ρ1 and ρ 2 be the gain to performance ratios for organization 1 and organization 2,
respectively, for each unit of performance that translates into earnings (Machlup, 1980). These
parameters also signify how much the knowledge each organization appropriates by putting
intellectual property protections such as patents, secrecy, know-how, and complementary sales
and service in place, which will ultimately translate into earnings (Cohen, Nelson, & Walsh,
2000).

Specifically, ρ1 is the increase in the expected gain function πˆ1 per unit increase in

performance Pˆ (a ) without taking into account the investment firm 1 makes in the venture (at).
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Similarly, ρ 2 is the increase in the expected gain function πˆ 2 , per unit increase in performance
Pˆ (a ) , without taking into account the investment firm 2 makes in the venture (a(1-t)). ρ1 and

ρ 2 are henceforth referred to as gain to performance ratios. Let these be constants. Organization
1’s participation rate, t with 0 ≥ t ≥ 1 , is its share of current knowledge creation efforts and that of
organization 2 is 1-t. The expected gains for organization 1 and organization 2 and those for the
entire system are:

πˆ1 = ρ1 [α − a −γ ] − at

(3)

πˆ 2 = ρ 2 [α − a −γ ] − a (1 − t )

(4)

πˆ = ( ρ1 + ρ 2 )[α − a −γ ] − a

(5)

The following figure shows the system performance (P(a)) and system gain (π) as
functions of the total current knowledge creation effort (a).
System gain
Performance (P)

Current Knowledge Creation Effort (a)

Figure 2: Performance and Expected System Gain as Functions of Current Knowledge
Creation Effort
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At this point, I wish to make a note on the universality of the parameters used in the
model.

Note that the parameters used in this essay and the following two essays, and the

relationships among them, have been formulated to be appropriate for collaborations in which
there is joint creation of knowledge.

Such assumptions about the parameters and the

relationships among them should be carefully examined before applying in other situations. For
instance, while applying the model to non-knowledge creation alliances, specifically those that
are formed for exchange of more tangible products, a parameter for depreciation should be
factored into the model. Similarly, while applying the model to a licensing agreement, the
licensing fee may be a better parameter than the participation rate that can be included in the
model. Similarly, the applicability of the current model is expected to be limited in merger and
acquisition scenarios because then the parameters, which illustrate the amount of autonomy the
consumed organization has in the collaborative activities, have to be included.
By solving the gain function for the dyad with respect to the current knowledge creation
efforts a, and by setting the first partial derivative to zero, one can determine the optimal value of
current knowledge creation efforts as follows:
∂πˆ
= ( ρ1 + ρ 2 )γa −(γ +1) − 1 = 0
∂a

(6)

The optimal value of current knowledge creation efforts, a* is:
1

a* = [γ ( ρ1 + ρ 2 )]γ +1

(7)

From Equation (7), one can deduce that the optimal value of the current knowledge
creation efforts is a function of the sum of the organizations’ individual expected profit and the
performance to investment sensitivity of current knowledge creation efforts.
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Substituting the optimal value for current knowledge creation efforts in Equation 5, we get the
equilibrium value for the expected system gain as follows:

⎧

⎛ γ ⎞
⎟
⎜

⎫

1

πˆ * = ( ρ1 + ρ 2 )⎨α − [γ (ρ1 + ρ 2 )]−⎜⎝ γ +1 ⎟⎠ ⎬ − [γ (ρ1 + ρ 2 )]γ +1
⎩

⎭

(8)

In order to arrive at a cost-sharing scheme for both partner organizations, it is now
important to consider the equations for expected gain functions for the individual organizations,
since the expected system gain is not a function of the participation rate. In a partnership game,
although the expected system gain is maximized, the collaborating organizations achieve this
while maximizing their individual gains. In other words, firm 1 prefers a participation rate that
maximizes πˆ1 and firm 2 prefers a participation rate that maximizes πˆ 2 . As mentioned earlier,
since there is no “single optimal value of t” that can be determined by optimizing the expected
system gain, the players in the game are free to negotiate the participation rate.
Following Eliashberg’s (1986) arbitration approach, it is specified that the “risk-sharing
scheme” agreed on by both of the organizations depends on each organization’s risk tolerance
(bi) and bargaining power ( λi ).
The organizations’ risk tolerance can be captured in their individual utility functions for
individual payoffs (Eliashberg et al., 1981). The individual utility functions are then aggregated
into a utility function for the system (dyad). The aggregation weights that are used to combine
the individual utility functions into a single system utility function are the individual bargaining
powers of the organizations. Of the several types of multi-attribute utility functions, the additive
forms have been recognized as the most appropriate to be used for decision analytic applications
(Eliashberg et al., 1981; Huang et al., 2002) and also as the most popular ones (Eliashberg,
1986). Hence, I consider the system utility function to be additive of the individual utility
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functions of the partner organizations. I assume that both organizations in the alliance have low
risk tolerance and have the following utility functions:
− ( b 1 πˆ 1 )

u 1 ( πˆ 1 ) = 1 − e

(9)

and

u 2 ( πˆ 2 ) = 1 − e

− ( b 2 πˆ 2 )

(10)

These utility functions, when added along with the aggregation weights, give the system utility
function, which is:

u (πˆ1 , πˆ 2 ) = 1 − λ1e − (b1πˆ1 ) − λ2 e − (b2πˆ2 )

(11)

where λ1 and λ2 are the aggregation weights and λ1 + λ 2 = 1 .
Partially differentiating u with respect to πˆ1 and πˆ 2 , subject to the constraint πˆ1 + πˆ 2 = πˆ , gives
the values of πˆ1 and πˆ 2 that maximize the utility function weighted by bargaining power
u (πˆ1 , πˆ 2 ) as follows:

πˆ1* =

b1
λb
1
πˆ +
ln 1 1
b1 + b2
b1 + b2 λ 2 b2

or πˆ1 = jπˆ + w ; where j =
*

(12)

1
b1
λb
and w =
ln 1 1
b1 + b2
b1 + b2 λ 2 b2

Similarly:

πˆ 2 * =

b2
λb
1
ln 2 2
πˆ +
b1 + b2
b1 + b2 λ1b1

(13)

*
or πˆ 2 = (1 − j )πˆ − w

We know from Equation (3) that πˆ1 = ρ1 [α − a −γ ] − at . By inserting the value of a* into this
equation, I find the optimal value for t:
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πˆ1 * = ρ1 [α − (a *)−γ ] − a * t = jπˆ + w or
− jπˆ − w + ρ1 [α − (a *) ]
a*
−γ

t* =

(14)

Similarly, I find t* from Equation (4) (expressed in terms of ρ2) as follows:

πˆ 2 * = ρ 2 [α − a *−γ ] − (1 − t )a* = (1 − j )πˆ − w or
(1 − j )πˆ − w − ρ 2 [α − (a *) ]
a*
−γ

t* = 1 +

(15)

See Appendix D for proof that Equations (14) and (15) are equivalent.
The equilibrium values for total current knowledge creation efforts, expected system gain, and
participation rate are summarized in Table 4 below.

1

a* = [γ ( ρ1 + ρ 2 )]γ +1

(16)

⎧

⎛ γ ⎞
⎜
⎟

⎫

1

π * = ( ρ1 + ρ 2 )⎨α − [γ (ρ1 + ρ 2 )]−⎜⎝ γ +1 ⎟⎠ ⎬ − [γ (ρ1 + ρ 2 )]γ +1
⎩

(1 − j )πˆ − w − ρ 2 [α − (a *) ]
− jπˆ − w + ρ 1 [α − (a *) ]
= 1+
a*
a*
−γ

t* =

(17)

⎭

−γ

(18)

Table 4: Equilibrium Values for Scenario 1 (Current Knowledge Creation Efforts Only).
4.2.2 Analysis of Results

Based on the equilibrium results shown in Table 4, one can make the following
observations, which are then generalized as propositions.

The level of current knowledge

creation efforts that maximizes the aggregate utility function, weighted by bargaining power, is a
function of the combined gain to performance ratios of both organizations and the performance
to investment sensitivity of current knowledge creation efforts. The optimal participation rate of
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each organization in the current knowledge creation efforts is a function of its risk tolerance and
its bargaining power. Hence, the analysis of the results is presented in the ensuing sub-sections
as it relates to the consideration of risk tolerance of an organization, consideration of the
bargaining power of an organization, and the joint consideration of the risk tolerance and
bargaining powers. It has to be noted here that the model and the equilibrium values assume that
the collaboration experiences some financial gains as a result of the collaborative knowledge
creation. As mentioned in Section 1.3, the forensics of collaborations that do not make any gain
are out of the scope of this study.
Consideration of Risk Tolerance

The risk tolerance of an organization has a considerable bearing on its participation in the
current knowledge creation efforts. As shown by the first part of the equation for the equilibrium
value of optimal participation rate, an organization with lesser risk tolerance 7 in other words, a
risk averse organization contributes more toward current knowledge creation efforts. Since
making an investment can be construed as taking risk, this observation is counter to the general
notion that risk avoiding individuals or organizations tend to not make more investments in the
joint venture.
In this regard, the results provide a different interpretation of risky behavior and the steps
that a risk averse organization takes in order to mitigate the risk. There have been instances
where joint ventures have been dissolved due to financial reasons 8. Making adequate financial
efforts could be one way by which low risk tolerant organizations exercise control over the

7

Organizations with lesser risk tolerance are henceforth referred to as risk avoiding organizations, and those with
high risk tolerance are referred to as risk seeking organizations.
8
See the joint venture between Saab-Scania and Fairchild in Mowery, D. C. 1988. International Collaborative
Ventures in US Manufacturing. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger., for a detailed exposition of the case and where the
reason for the failure of this collaboration has been specified as financial burdens.
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outcome of the joint venture (Child & Yan, 2003). If both organizations have the same amount
of risk tolerance, they may participate equally in the collaboration, as illustrated by the presence
of several equity joint ventures.
As shown by the second part of the equation for equilibrium value for the optimal
participation rate, an organization with a higher risk tolerance or a risk seeking organization
tends to get a better share of the overall system gain. This is again in tune with the notion
prevailing in traditional finance literature that higher risk leads to greater rewards.

Proposition 1a: A higher risk-tolerant organization’s participation rate in current
knowledge creation efforts is less compared to that of the lesser risk-tolerant
organization 9.
Proposition 1b: A higher risk-tolerant organization is expected to get a greater
share of the expected system gain.
The above two propositions clarify the link between the risk tolerance and risk behavior.
One would imagine that logically a lower risk tolerant organization would participate less
compared to higher risk-tolerant organization. However, the results suggest otherwise. It is
interesting to note that although the higher risk-tolerant organization tends to get away with
lower participation rate (lesser share of the investment), it does get a better share of the system
gain. This analysis reveals that greater investment does not always lead to greater returns. The
reason why this happens could be because the higher risk-tolerant organization might seek other
sources of information and might be able to take a calculated risk. On the other hand, the lower
risk tolerant organization might want to ensure the success of the collaboration by primarily
investing in it without the expectation of a higher share of the total gain.
In cases where the organizations are expected to have similar levels of risk tolerance, the
participation rate is more likely to be comparable for both organizations. That is, both are likely
9

Some of the propositions developed in this essay may seem circular with the assumptions made in the essay. An
explanation is given clarifying the absence of such circularity for Essay 1 in Appendix E.
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participate equally in the knowledge creation endeavor. For instance, consider the case of
collaborations between giants such as Wal-Mart and Proctor and Gamble (P&G). Over the years
the relationship between these two organizations has developed into that between equal partners
from an earlier stage when P&G dominated the relationship. In the days of its dominance, P&G
forced Wal-Mart into a higher participation rate by way of carrying more sizes of P&G’s
products and limited supply of products that were high in demand (Huang et al., 2002). As WalMart grew, the relationship unfolded into one where systems were put in place to promote
information sharing and joint planning. In such cases where both organizations have similar
levels of risk tolerance, the current model predicts that their participation in the relationship is
expected to be equal.
Consideration of Bargaining Power

The second part of Equation (18) brings to light the effect of the bargaining power of an
organization on its optimal participation rate. According to the equilibrium value, an
organization with greater bargaining power can negotiate and tilt the scales in their favor,
thereby contributing less than the organization with less bargaining power. The result of the
above analysis is intuitive since in negotiation games, whoever is in a better position to bargain
tends to shift the scales in their favor by manipulating the potential or current partners. The
consideration of bargaining power leads us to the following proposition:

Proposition 2: An organization with greater bargaining power will participate
less in the current knowledge creation effort than that with lesser bargaining
power.
Similar to the situation for risk tolerance, when organizations that have equal bargaining
power collaborate, the participation rate is expected to be equal.
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Joint Consideration of Risk Tolerance and Bargaining Power

Having recognized in the previous analyses that the participation rate in the current
knowledge creation efforts depends on both the risk tolerance and the bargaining power, a
logical step in this direction would be to speculate the joint effect of risk tolerance and
bargaining power on the organization’s behavior in terms of being able to manipulate its
potential or current partner. For instance, based on the various combinations of risk tolerance
and bargaining power, the organizations could fall into one of the four categories depicted in
Table 5.
Risk Tolerance
Low

High

Bargaining

Low

1

2

Power

High

3

4

Table 5: Categories of Organizations Based on Risk Tolerance and Bargaining Power

An organization belonging to quadrant 1 is characterized with low risk tolerance and low
bargaining power, and hence might not have any ability to manipulate either its potential partners
or its current partners. By Propositions 1a, 1b, and 2, this organization might end up contributing
more to the current knowledge creation efforts while getting a leaner share of the system gains.
The organization in quadrant 4 is high in risk tolerance and has greater bargaining power. This
puts the organization in an advantageous position along two lines. On the one hand, it can get
away with participating less and getting a better share of the system gain in relation to its partner
on the other. The organization in quadrant 2 is more risk tolerant with lower bargaining power
than its partner. This might lead to the situation of lesser participation rate and lesser share of
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the system gain. The third quadrant organization is characterized by low risk tolerance and high
bargaining power. Such an organization not only contributes more towards current knowledge
creation efforts but also gets a fair share of the system gain.
The above observations shed new light on the issue of how the benefits or economic rents
(Madhok & Tallman, 1998) of collaboration efforts are distributed among participants. The
supply chain literature has recognized the concerns regarding the distribution of gains due to
collaboration. For example, Sengupta (2001) indicated that supply chain management benefits
are always an issue of concern for collaborating organizations. However, little theoretical
guidance exists to help determine the degree of this inequality and its impact on decision-making
and the relationship that develops between collaborating organizations.
The above analysis has implications in the pre-alliance formation stage during partner
selection. When shopping for partners, an organization can take into account their respective
bargaining powers and the risk tolerance of potential partners and select the partner that might be
best suited for the current knowledge creation endeavor. Current literature on partner selection
stresses criteria such as reciprocity, past partnership outcomes, experience, (Li & Rowley, 2002)
complementary capabilities, and financial assets (Hitt et al., 2000) for evaluating potential
partners. In addition to these criteria, when informed by the above analysis, organizations can
evaluate potential partners based on their risk tolerance and the characteristics that might put
them in a more powerful position to bargain. Similarly, these propositions have implications for
alliance re-negotiations in the post-alliance formation stage (Reuer, Zollo, & Singh, 2002). For
instance, they noted that after formation, alliances could negotiate to change their alliance scope,
division of labor and alliance relevance, technological experience, and partner-specific
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experience. My analysis indicates that these re-negotiations can include the participation rate.
These re-negotiations, in turn, might lead to changes in the alliance’s governance structure.
This implication is within the purview of real options theory (Bowman & Hurry, 1993).
Evaluating an organization’s strategies in selecting partners and re-negotiating participation rate
for continued collaboration are some options available to them in the pre- and post- formation
stages open a rather novel line of enquiry in alliance literature. Hence, strategic decisions that
organizations could make regarding future incremental investments in a collaborative effort
might be guided by an evaluation of choices that are available to the organization at important
turning points during the course of collaboration.
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4.3 Scenario 2: Alliances between Organizations with Prior Efforts
In this sub-section, an example of Scenario 2 is presented, which illustrates a
combination of prior and current efforts in knowledge creation, along with the corresponding
performance function. The joint venture between Lucent and Phillips for the creation of a
separate entity, Phillips Consumer Communications (PCC), in 1997, is an example of this type of
joint venture. Both organizations were big players in their own markets and have created the
joint venture PCC in order to harness the technology available from Phillips Research and
Lucent Technologies/Bell Labs. The specific joint venture was formed to develop the PCS
wireless phone and the Philips Digital PCS 1900 with Voice DialTM, featuring a smart phone
add-on for wireless faxing, e-mail and World Wide Web access.
The performance function for Scenario 2 P (a, q1 , q 2 ) is affected by the total current
knowledge creation efforts a (as in Scenario 1), and additionally by prior knowledge creation
efforts ( q1 and q 2 ) made by each organization, independently, before entering the alliance. The
performance P (a, q1 , q 2 ) approaches a saturation point α as a or q1 and q 2 increase. The
performance functions (1) and (2) from Scenario 1 are now modified as
−δ

P (a, q1 , q 2 ) = α − a −γ q1 1 q 2

−δ 2

+ε

(19)

and
−δ
−δ
Pˆ (a, q1 , q 2 ) = α − a −γ q1 1 q 2 2

(20)

where α, γ,  δ 1 and δ 2 are positive constants
In agreement with the discussion of the performance function for Scenario 1, this
function is non-linear, and non-decreasing. When a , q1 and q 2 tend to infinity, then Pˆ (a, q1 , q 2 )
tends to α the “performance saturation asymptote” mentioned in Section 3.1. The parameters
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γ δ 1 and δ 2 are called the performance to investment sensitivities. The higher the value of γ, the

greater the influence of current knowledge creation efforts on performance; and the higher the
values of δ 1 and δ 2 , the greater the influence of prior knowledge creation efforts on
performance. I assume that γ is greater than both δ 1 and δ 2 , which means that current
knowledge creation efforts have a higher performance to investment sensitivity than prior
knowledge creation efforts. This is due to the notion that any current knowledge creation effort is
expected to have more effect on the performance of a particular project than prior knowledge
creation efforts, whose returns are spread over a longer time period and over many projects and
activities. As in Scenario 1, t an organization’s participation rate, continues to affect the
individual and system gains.
In the next sub-section, I present the gain functions of the individual organizations, and
the dyad. I then present the equilibrium values for current knowledge creation efforts,
participation rate, and the dyad’s gain under the second scenario.
4.3.1 Gain Functions and Equilibrium Values

The expected gain functions for both organizations in the dyad and that for the entire
system are given by:

πˆ1 = ρ1 [α − a −γ q1 −δ q 2 −δ ] − at

(21)

πˆ 2 = ρ 2 [α − a −γ q1 −δ q 2 −δ ] − a(1 − t )

(22)

πˆ = ( ρ1 + ρ 2 )[α − a −γ q1 −δ q 2 −δ ] − a

(23)

1

2

1

2

1

2

By first maximizing the system gain function and setting the first partial derivative to zero, one
can determine the optimal value of current knowledge creation efforts as follows:
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[

]

∂ πˆ
−δ 1
−δ
= ( ρ 1 + ρ 2 ) a − (γ +1 ) q 1 q 2 2 γ − 1 = 0
∂a

(24)

Then we get the optimal value of current knowledge creation efforts as:

[

−δ

a * = ( ρ1 + ρ 2 )(γq1 1 q 2

−δ 2

]

1

) γ +1

(25)

By inserting the value of a* from Equation (25) into Equation (23) we get the optimal value of
the expected system gain, which is:
−δ1

πˆ * = ( ρ1 + ρ 2 ){α − [( ρ1 + ρ 2 )(γq1 q 2

−δ 2

)]

⎛ γ ⎞
⎟⎟
−⎜⎜
⎝ γ +1 ⎠

1
−δ1

q1 q 2

−δ 2

−δ 1

} − [( ρ1 + ρ 2 )(γq1 q 2

−δ 2

)]

γ +1

(26)
The optimal value for t is calculated in the same way as under Scenario 1, and the results yield
t * as follows:

t* =

ρ1 [α − ((a *)−γ q1 −δ q 2 −δ )] − jπˆ − w

t* = 1 +

[

1

a*

1+

or

(27)

ρ 2 [α − ((a *)−γ q1 −δ q 2 −δ )] + (1 − j )πˆ − w
1

2

(28)

a*

−δ

a * = ( ρ1 + ρ 2 )(γq1 1 q 2

t* =

2

−δ 2

]

1

(29)

) γ +1

ρ1 [α − ((a *)−γ q1 −δ q 2 −δ )] − jπˆ − w
1

2

a*

=

ρ 2 [α − ((a *)−γ q1 −δ q 2 −δ )] + (1 − j )πˆ − w
1

2

(30)

a*
−δ1

π * = (ρ1 + ρ 2 ){α − [(ρ1 + ρ 2 )(γq1 q2

−δ 2

⎛ γ ⎞
⎟⎟
−⎜⎜
⎝ γ +1 ⎠

)]

1
−δ1

q1 q2

−δ 2

−δ1

} − [(ρ1 + ρ 2 )(γq1 q2

−δ 2

γ +1

)]

(31)

Table 6: Equilibrium Values for Scenario 2 (Combined Prior and Current Knowledge Creation
Efforts)
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4.3.2 Analysis of Results

By inspecting the equilibrium values of current knowledge creation efforts a * and the
participation rate t * in Table 6, I conclude the following: first, the equilibrium value for the
current knowledge creation efforts a * is a function of both organizations’ prior knowledge
creation efforts, in addition to their gain to performance ratios; second, the participation rate is
still a function of the risk tolerance and bargaining power of each organization. Hence, the
presence of prior knowledge creation efforts does not affect the participation rate in the current
knowledge creation effort.
The expected system gain is a function of prior knowledge creation efforts as well as a
function of gain to performance ratios and performance to investment sensitivities. The
propositions made for Scenario 1 still apply for Scenario 2, and hence will not be repeated here.
However, the results of Scenario 2 are better understood in comparison with those of Scenario 1,
which is presented as a cross-scenario analysis in the next sub-section.
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4.4 Cross-scenario Analysis
A comparison of the equilibrium values under both scenarios reveals two dissimilarities
and one similarity. The first dissimilarity is that the optimum current knowledge creation efforts
are lower when organizations in the dyad have expended prior knowledge creation efforts. The
equilibrium value for a in Scenario 2 is less than that in Scenario 1 by a factor of the products of
prior knowledge creation efforts. This suggests that when organizations already have some prior
knowledge creation efforts in the form of R&D infrastructure, or a unique prior knowledge base,
fewer resources are needed to start a new R&D project.

This observation reconfirms the

theoretical notion that experience is important, in addition to investment in inter-organizational
learning (Lane et al., 1998).
The second dissimilarity is that system gain is higher under Scenario 2, with prior
knowledge creation efforts than with only current knowledge creation efforts by a factor of the
product of the prior knowledge creation efforts. This is again intuitive in the sense that when
there are indirect and current knowledge creation efforts, the overall gain for the dyad is higher
because of lower expenses.

Both of these dissimilarities can be stated as the following

propositions

Proposition 3a: The optimal value of current knowledge creation efforts is lower
in the presence of prior knowledge creation efforts (Scenario 2) than without
prior knowledge creation efforts (Scenario 1).
Proposition 3b: The optimal expected system gain is higher in the presence of
prior knowledge creation efforts (Scenario 2) than without prior knowledge
creation efforts (Scenario 1).
Proposition 3a appears intuitive since organizations that have made prior efforts toward
knowledge creation would have to make lower efforts for current knowledge creation. In tune
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with traditional production economics, if the efforts made toward knowledge creation could be
considered to include fixed costs and variables costs, organizations with prior knowledge
creation efforts would have already made some investments, in terms of fixed costs (Scenario 2)
and would have to expend only variable costs that might be typical for the current knowledge
creation endeavor. In contrast, collaborations where both organizations have not made any prior
efforts towards knowledge creation (Scenario 1) would have to expend both fixed costs and
variable costs for the current knowledge creation endeavor.
Similarly, Proposition 3b appears intuitive since having prior efforts in knowledge
creation (Scenario 2) will give rise to higher net system gain because total costs would be lesser
than when there are no prior efforts in knowledge creation (Scenario 1). Propositions 3a and 3b
imply that organizations are better off partnering with other organizations that have made some
prior efforts toward knowledge creation than partnering with those starting afresh. In scenarios
where one of the organizations has made considerably less prior efforts in knowledge creation
than the other, the organization with less prior efforts stands to gain more by collaborating, rather
than creating knowledge on its own. This is true since the organization with less prior efforts
would still share a better portion of the system gain when in collaboration, than without
collaboration.
As in the analysis for Scenario 1, the above two propositions have implications for
partner selection. These propositions endorse prior research, with respect to partner selection,
that capabilities have to be taken into consideration while choosing alliance partners (Doz &
Hamel, 1998; Hitt et al., 2000; Luo, 1997). Unique prior knowledge, or prior efforts in
knowledge creation, give the firms capabilities that could be extended to the current knowledge
creation endeavor (Hagedoorn & Duysters, 2002). Hence, organizations with prior efforts in
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knowledge creation are better potential partners than those with no prior knowledge creation
efforts.
The similarity between Scenario 1 and Scenario 2 is that the optimal participation rate
does not change across the scenarios. The analysis of similarities provides some insights, about
the relationship between the collaborating organizations, which are stated as the proposition
below:

Proposition 4: The participation rate of an organization in the current knowledge
creation efforts is negatively associated with both its risk tolerance and
bargaining power, regardless of its prior knowledge creation efforts.
Proposition 4 reveals that, structurally, the participation rate in the current knowledge
creation efforts depends on risk tolerance and bargaining power with or without prior efforts.
The proportion of profits shared by an organization is a function of its risk tolerance, as can be
observed from the optimal value for the participation rate t * . So the organization that can take
higher risks is the one to appropriate a greater proportion of expected system gain. In other
words, an organization that can participate more, will, in fact, appropriate a greater proportion of
expected system gain. Additionally, the organization with a greater bargaining power will
participate less in the collaboration. In any cooperative agreement, one partner’s dependence on
the other’s resources might put it in a situation which might give rise to the existence of
bargaining power (Inkpen et al., 1997).

Hence, in a partnership-based collaboration, it is

possible that one organization is in a more powerful position than the other and uses this power
to bargain for a participation rate closer to 0. The organization in the dependent position
attempts to get the first organization to commit to a participation rate closer to 1.
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4.5 Discussion
In Essay 1, a partnership-based framework for examining the resource-sharing decisions
between two collaborating knowledge creation organizations is presented. Two likely scenarios
suitable for collaborative knowledge creation were identified and investigated. Scenario 1 is
where the only effort expended is current knowledge creation effort, and Scenario 2 is where
prior knowledge creation effort including unique prior knowledge has been expended. The
resource-sharing model was developed under both of these scenarios, and the equilibrium values
were found for current knowledge creation efforts a, prior knowledge creation efforts q1 and q2,
an organization’s participation rate t, and expected system gain πˆ .
Risk tolerance and bargaining power of an organization were identified as factors that
determine its share in the current knowledge creation efforts. With regard to the nature of
relationship, risk tolerance and bargaining power were found to have a negative effect on the
participation rate. In other words, an organization with high risk tolerance has a lesser
participation rate as does an organization with more bargaining power. Additionally, a link was
identified between the risk tolerance and bargaining power of an organization to the share of the
total system gain appropriated by it. An organization with high risk tolerance appropriates a
greater proportion of system gain. This answers the first research question about what are the
factors that determine the resource participation rate and how do they influence the participation
rate.
In order to find the conditions under which some of the potential partners become more
attractive than others, the equilibrium values of current knowledge creation efforts, participation
rate, and the system gain were compared for both of the scenarios. It was found that while the
amount of optimal current knowledge creation efforts is lower when both organizations in the
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collaboration have already made prior knowledge creation efforts in the knowledge domain
where new knowledge is being created, the participation rate remains the same, regardless of
whether the two organizations have made prior knowledge creation efforts. Also, the system
gain is higher when there is a combination of direct and prior knowledge creation efforts. Thus,
this answers the second research question about what are the conditions under which some of the
potential partners become more attractive than others. The third research question regarding the
conditions, under which collaborations exist, however, is not answered in this essay since the
equilibrium values hold true under all conditions.
The theoretical implications of the current essay are manifold. Recall the two limitations
of TCE identified in Section 2.1. First, although TCE proposes the motivation for the formation
of collaborations, it does not provide micro level direction (Krishnan et al., 2001) about how to
devise resource-sharing strategies.

Second, TCE is limited in that it focuses on cost

minimization, as opposed to value maximization (Dyer, 1997). The current essay compliments
TCE by providing details of what factors come into play while making resource-sharing
decisions.

For instance, informed by Propositions 1a, 1b and 2, a potential partner’s

demonstrated risk tolerance and bargaining power are recognized as factors that play a role in the
resource-sharing decisions that the collaborating organizations make.

Additionally, the

partnership game, with a goal of maximizing the expected system gain, reiterates the value
maximization proposition that TCE is recognized to overlook.
One of the limitations of RDT is that it does not provide the nuances of how inter-firm
transfer of resources takes place during the course of the collaboration (Barringer et al., 2000).
This essay thus enhances our understanding of inter-firm collaborations. Specifically,
Propositions 1a and 2 inform the collaborating organizations about which factors determine the
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resource-sharing rate and how these factors affect the resource-sharing decisions. The essay
further complements the theory by providing guidance about partner selection strategies.
Specifically, Propositions 3a and 3b inform how the potential partners with prior knowledge
creation effort compare to those without such prior efforts.
This essay also is in the line of enhancing the organizational learning theory in the
following way. The basic structure of the game where the goal of the game is to maximize the
expected system gain addresses one of the necessary directions (Larsson et al., 1998) that has
been recognized for learning theory to progress if its contributions were to go beyond interpartner learning or learning races.
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Chapter 5 ESSAY 2: COLLABORATIVE KNOWLEDGE
CREATION AS A LEADER-FOLLOWER GAME- CASE OF
BOTH FIRMS WITH INCREASING MARGINAL RETURNS
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5.1 Introduction to Essay 2
In this essay, Case 2 identified in Section 3.3, where the performance function for both of
the organizations is formulated with the increasing marginal returns with respect to knowledge
creation investments and is studied as a leader-follower game (Stackelberg, 1934). In this game,
the leader is the one in a position to make decisions, and the follower is the organization that
reacts to the leader’s decisions. In the two-stage game, the leader chooses a participation rate (t).
In the second stage, the follower observes the leader’s choice of the participation rate (t) and
chooses a value of the current knowledge creation effort (a).
The Stackelberg game is played under the assumption of complete and perfect
information (Savaskan, Bhattacharya, & van Wassenhove, 2004; Van Cayseele & Furth, 2001).
Although the leader makes the first move in this game, the equilibrium value of the game is
determined through backward induction by solving for the follower’s reaction function first
(Gibbons, 1997). By solving for the follower’s function first, one can arrive at a preferred value
of current knowledge creation effort (a), which maximizes its individual gain (πˆ F ) as a function
of the leader’s participation rate (t). Such preferred value of current knowledge creation effort
(a) is called the “best response value” for the follower. Given the follower’s best response value,
the leader’s best response value equilibrium value of its participation rate (t) that maximizes its
individual gain πˆ L is computed. The equilibrium values for the current knowledge creation
effort (a), the leader’s participation rate (t), and the expected total system gain (πˆ ) are derived
and analyzed.
Essay 2 includes a logical addition to the performance function by introducing the
organizations’ capacity to commercialize commonly-produced knowledge. For instance, the
model in Section 4.2 was specified exclusively with respect to investment, which has been
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captured in two ways: current efforts and prior efforts. Theoretically, these types of investments
represented the portions of economic rents generated by the current effort and prior efforts that
could be useful for the current knowledge creation endeavor. In this essay, a factor of production,
which represents the capacity of each firm to commercialize the knowledge produced, is
modeled into the performance function and eventually into the gain functions in addition to
current knowledge creation effort. Literature has evidence that the appropriability of knowledge
created influences level of R&D investments (Veugelers & Cassiman, 1999). Specifically, low
levels of appropriation may provide a disincentive to invest further in R&D, since a firm may not
be able to realize the full benefit of its investment (Arrow, 1962; Spense, 1984). The theoretical
concept linking such a capacity of a firm to “understand, assimilate and apply new knowledge to
commercial ends” is absorptive capacity (Cohen et al., 1990).
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5.2 Collaborations between Organizations with Increasing Marginal Returns
As mentioned in Section 2.2, organizations that are characterized by increasing
marginal return are newer, entrepreneurial firms, typically engaged in radical innovation or in the
creation of a new stream of knowledge rather than building on existing knowledge. This also
applies to alliances in highly knowledge-intensive industries such as biotechnology. In such
knowledge-intensive industries, research alliances between firms are commonplace. For instance,
the strategic research alliance between Genzyme General and Genovo Incorporated to develop
gene therapy products for lysosomal storage disorders, a class of rare genetic diseases
(Anonymous, 1999). Genzyme’s expertise lies in developing therapy for lysosomal storage
disorders, and that of Genovo’s lies in developing gene therapy knowledge. The motivation
behind the collaboration has been articulated as the access to each other’s expertise and the
subsequent combination of resources to develop new gene therapy products. Since both of the
organizations are involved in developing breakthrough products, it is logical to assume that both
of them are characterized by increasing marginal return functions.
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5.3 Gain Functions and Equilibrium Values
The performance function for Case 2 is specified as:

P ( a, c ) = a γ c φ + ε

(32)

where P is the performance, which is a function of investment in the current knowledge
creation endeavor (a) and the capability (c) of a firm to commercialize common knowledge. The
commercialization of knowledge is a parameter that is being included in the model to
accommodate the capacity of the firm to translate the knowledge generated into actual monetary
value. The parameter γ is the performance to investment sensitivity of current knowledge
creation effort, and φ is the sensitivity of the commercialization capacity.
The expected performance function could be modified as:

Pˆ (a, c) = a γ c φ

(33)

It is assumed that the values of γ are the same for both of the collaborating firms.
However, the vales of φ differ for the organizations.
The expected gain function for a firm i is specified as a function of the firm’s
performance and its risk tolerance (b). For collaborations where both firm are characterized by
increasing marginal returns, the returns increase infinitely for infinite investment. This would
result in infinite optimal investment. Since, in reality, infinite investments are not possible, the
factor of risk tolerance is introduced in order to arrive at an optimal investment. The risk
tolerance factor is a positive fraction and is less than

1

γ

(that is, b <

1

γ

or γb < 1 ). The value of

the product γb has to be less than 1 in order for the existence of a finite optimal investment
value. Lower values of risk tolerance mean that the collaboration is less willing to take risks, and
higher values of risk tolerance mean that the collaboration is willing to take risk. The expected
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gain function for firm i is now modified as follows πˆ i = (ρ i a γ c φ ) − a(t i ) where (ti ) is the
b

participation rate.
The expected gain function for the leader organization is given by:

(

)

πˆ L = ρ L [a γ cLφ ] − at
b

L

(

Let L2 = ρ L c L

) . Then the expected gain function for the leader can be written as

φL b

πˆ L = L2 a γb − at

(34)

The expected gain function for the follower organization is given by:

(

)

πˆ F = ρ F [a γ c F φ ] − a(1 − t )
b

F

(

Let F2 = ρ F c F

)

φF b

. Then the expected gain function for the follower is:

γb

πˆ F = F2 a − a(1 − t )

(35)

πˆ = πˆ L + πˆ F = [L2 + F2 ](a γb ) − a

(36)

The performance and the expected gain as functions of the current knowledge creation
effort (a) are shown in the Figure 3. Note that the discussion regarding the universality of
assumptions presented in Section 4.3 still holds true for the assumptions made in this essay.

Performance
System Gain

Investment (a)

Figure 3: Performance and Expected System Gain as Functions of Investment
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The follower’s best response value of the current knowledge creation effort (a) is
computed by setting the first partial derivative of the follower’s expected gain function in
Equation (35) to zero.

∂πˆ F
= F2γba γb −1 − (1 − t ) = 0
∂a

(37)

Then, we get the value of current knowledge creation effort that maximizes the follower’s
expected gain as a function of t as follows:

⎛ 1− t ⎞
⎟⎟
a * = ⎜⎜
⎝ F2γb ⎠

1

γb −1

(38)

Given the follower’s best response value of a*, the leader’s best response value for its
participation rate (t) is computed as one that maximizes its expected gain πˆ L . In order to arrive
at the value of t that maximizes πˆ L , the leader’s expected gain function is maximized with
respect to t subject to the constraint in Equation (38)

Max πˆ L = L2 [a *γb ] − a * t
t

(39)

subject to the constraint 0 < t < 1 where a* is as expressed in Equation (38).
Substituting the value for a* as in Equation (38) in Equation (39) gives the optimization problem
for the leader organization as:
γb
1
⎛
⎞
⎜ ⎛ 1 − t ⎞ γb −1 ⎛ 1 − t ⎞ γb −1 ⎟
⎟⎟
⎟⎟ t ⎟
∂⎜ L2 ⎜⎜
− ⎜⎜
F
b
F
b
γ
γ
⎝ 2 ⎠
⎜ ⎝ 2 ⎠
⎟
∂πˆ L
⎠ =0
= ⎝
∂t
∂t

(40)

85

subject to 0 < t < 1 . Solving (40) for t, we get the value of t that maximizes the leader’s expected
gain as follows:
t2 * =

F2 (γb − 1) + L2
F2 γb + L2

For the leader’s participation rate to be between 0 and 1,

L2
> 1 − γb .
F2

Substituting the value of t 2 * first in Equation (38) and then the values of t2* and a2* in Equation
(36), one can arrive at the equilibrium values for the current knowledge creation efforts and the
leader’s participation rate for the leader-follower game as shown in Table 7 below.
For simplicity sake, the term L2 will henceforth be referred to as leader term and the term
F2 as follower term for Case 2. The equilibrium values have a subscript of 2 to denote that they
represent those for Case 2.

⎛ 1 ⎞
⎜
⎟

a 2 * = (γb[F2 γb + L2 ])⎜⎝ 1−γb ⎟⎠

(41)

F2 (γb − 1) + L2
F2 γb + L2

(42)

t2 * =

⎧

⎛ γb ⎞
⎜
⎟

⎫

⎛ 1 ⎞
⎜
⎟

πˆ 2 * = ⎨[L2 + F2 ](γb[F2 γb + L2 ])⎜⎝ 1−γb ⎟⎠ ⎬ − (γb[F2 γb + L2 ])⎜⎝ 1−γb ⎟⎠
⎩

⎭

(43)

Table 7: Equilibrium Values for Leader-Follower Game-Case 2
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5.4 Analysis of Results
The equilibrium values presented in the above table help one make the following
observations. First, all three of these values are a function of the leader term, follower term, risk
tolerance, and performance to investment sensitivity of current knowledge creation effort. To
simplify the analysis of results, the leader term (L2) and the follower term (F2) are set equal
(L2=F2). A further investigation of the equilibrium value for current knowledge creation effort
(a2*) reveals that with everything else being constant, the equilibrium value of the current
knowledge creation effort (a2*) slowly increases as its performance to investment sensitivity

a 2*

increases as shown in Figure 4.

γ

Figure 4: Equilibrium Value of Current Knowledge Creation Effort as a Function of its
Performance to Investment Sensitivity
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Proposition 1a: The equilibrium value of current knowledge creation effort is a
concave upward function of the performance to investment sensitivity of current
knowledge creation effort. 10
A higher value for γ means that the change in the performance is more sensitive to the
change in the current knowledge creation effort. Proposition 1a implies that as the sensitivity of
the performance to the investment in the current knowledge creation project increases, so will the
investment in the current project. That is, the greater the promise of performance, the higher the
total investment in the current knowledge creation project will be.
Similarly, with an increase in b, the equilibrium values of the current knowledge creation

a 2*

effort increase as shown in Figure 5.

b

Figure 5: Equilibrium Value of Current Knowledge Creation Effort as a Function of Risk
Tolerance

Proposition 1b: The equilibrium value of current knowledge creation effort is a
concave upward function of the risk tolerance.

10

Some of the propositions developed in this essay may seem circular with the assumptions made in the essay. An
explanation clarifying the absence of such circularity for Essay 2 is given in Appendix F.
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Proposition 1b means that the organizations that are more risk tolerant invest more in the
current knowledge creation project to ensure better performance. The above Propositions 1a and
1b have implications for setting expectations for the collaboration. Informed by the propositions
above, the leader organizations can set expectations of what the follower’s preferred current
knowledge creation investment would be.
Second, the relation between the leader’s participation rate and the performance to
investment sensitivity of current knowledge creation effort is similar to the above relation. That
is, for higher values of the performance to investment sensitivity of current knowledge creation

t2*

effort, the leader’s participation rate will be higher, as shown in Figure 6.

γ

Figure 6: Equilibrium Value of Leader’s Participation Rate as a Function of Performance
to Investment Sensitivity of Current Knowledge Creation Effort

Proposition 2a: The leader’s participation rate is an increasing function of the
performance to investment sensitivity of current knowledge creation effort.
Similar to the implications for Proposition 1a, Proposition 2a implies that the leader’s
participation rate is a function of γ. This implies that the leader is willing to contribute more
toward the project if the performance is more sensitive to the increase in investment. Hence, the
follower organization would consider certain factors such as availability of substitutes as
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indicators of performance to investment sensitivity, while setting expectations from the
collaboration and hence determining its best response value of current knowledge creation effort.
For the follower organization, a higher γ not only means that there is a higher level of current
knowledge creation effort, but also, that the leader’s participation rate is higher.

t2*

The leader’s participation rate is a function of risk tolerance as shown in Figure 7.

b

Figure 7: Equilibrium Value of Leader's Participation Rate as a Function of Risk
Tolerance

Proposition 2b: The equilibrium value of the leader’s participation rate is a
convex upward function of risk tolerance.
Proposition 2b means that for collaborations with lower risk tolerance, the leader’s
participation rate will be low. That is, the leader organization participates less with a follower
organization less willing to take risk than that with higher risk tolerance. In conjunction with
Proposition 2a, Proposition 2b implies that for lower values of performance to investment
sensitivity of current knowledge creation effort, and for lower values of a risk tolerance, lower is
the leader’s participation rate.
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Third, an examination of the equilibrium value for t2* reveals that the ratio

L2
has to be
F2

greater than 1 − γb for the leader to participate.
Proposition 3: The leader participates and hence the collaboration exists only
L
when 2 > 1 − γb .
F2

The above proposition means that the leader will participate only if the ratio of leader
term to the follower term is greater than 1 − γb . Recall that γb is between 0 and 1, and L2 and F2
are positive constants. Then, Proposition 3 provides a lower bound for the ratio, which is a
positive fraction.
Finally, the equilibrium value of the expected system gain (π2*) is also a function of the

π2 *

performance to investment sensitivity of current knowledge creation effort as shown in Figure 8.

γ

Figure 8: Equilibrium Value of Expected System Gain as a Function of Performance to
Investment Sensitivity of Current Knowledge Creation Effort

Proposition 4a: The equilibrium value of the expected system gain is a concave
upward function of performance to investment sensitivity of current knowledge
creation effort.
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The above proposition has implications for the expectations that each organization has
from the results of the collaboration. This proposition informs the partnering organizations about
the nature of the gains they could expect for the collaboration as a whole. Note that in leaderfollower game, the players maximize their own expected gain functions and not the system gain
function. Hence Proposition 4a is descriptive of how the system gain changes for several values
of γ. Thus Proposition 4a serves a descriptive purpose in setting expectations, rather than serving
a prescriptive purpose of aiding decision-making.
Similarly, the equilibrium value of the expected system gain is a function of risk
tolerance. For lower and moderate values of risk tolerance, the expected system gain increases

π2 *

slowly; while for higher values, the expected system gain increases rapidly as shown in Figure 9.

b

Figure 9: Equilibrium Value of Expected System Gain as a Function of Risk Tolerance

Proposition 4b: The equilibrium value of the expected system gain is a concave
upward function of risk tolerance.
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Propositions 4b also describes how the expected system gain is a function of risk
tolerance.

This relation is also descriptive of setting expectations rather than serving a

prescriptive purpose of aiding decision-making.
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5.5 Discussion
In this essay, I provide a framework for studying resource-sharing between two
organizations engaged in collaborative knowledge creation. The collaboration is analyzed as a
Stackelberg Leader-Follower game between two organizations with increasing marginal returns.
The analysis reveals that the relation between the equilibrium value of the current
knowledge creation effort and performance to investment sensitivity is concave upward, as is the
relation between the equilibrium value of the current knowledge creation effort and risk
tolerance.
Similarly, the relation between the equilibrium value of the expected system gain and
performance to investment sensitivity is concave upward, as is the relation between the
equilibrium value of the expected system gain and risk tolerance.
The equilibrium value of the leader’s participation rate is a function of performance to
investment sensitivity and the risk tolerance. Additionally, the collaboration is possible and the
leader participates only if

L2
> 1 − γb .
F2

With respect to collaborations for knowledge creation, the propositions made here have
implications from several vantage points, ranging from establishing expectations from the
collaboration for the organizations to explaining the conditions under which collaborations exist.
Propositions 2a and 2b specify that the leader’s participation rate is a function of the
performance to investment sensitivity and risk tolerance. These propositions answer the research
question which factors influence participation rate.

Similarly, Proposition 3 specifies a

condition for the collaboration to exist, which is the third research question specified in the
Introduction.
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The results of the analysis in Essay 2 can be used to compare potential partners by each
of the collaborating organizations and thus answer the second research question. For instance,
informed by Propositions 1a, 1b, 2a, 2b, 4a and 4b, the organization in the leader’s position may
form expectations about the amount of investments the current collaboration might require, its
participation rate and the expected system gain. Specifically, if the performance to investment
sensitivity is high, then the leader organization can expect a higher current knowledge creation
investment. Also, with similar information, the leader organization can expect a higher system
gain and a higher share in the current knowledge creation investment. Similarly, the three
values - current knowledge creation investments, participation rate and expected system gain can also be expected to be higher when the follower organization has high risk tolerance than
those for a follower organization with low risk tolerance. Thus when choosing partners, the
leader organization can compare the risk tolerance and performance to investment sensitivity of
a portfolio of potential partners and choose the one that is expected to give the best tradeoff
between investments, gains and participation rate.
The follower organization, on the other hand, can use similar information about the
leader organization and choose a partner that is expected to give the best tradeoff between
investments, gains and participation rate. Thus, the propositions inform practice and answer
three out of the four research questions.
For researchers, this essay provides an insight into how the collaborations between
organizations with increasing marginal returns can be modeled as a leader-follower game.
Specifically, for organizations that are characterized by increasing marginal returns, the current
model provides a way to identify a value of current knowledge creation effort that will
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maximize its returns by introducing the risk tolerance parameter. It is this risk tolerance that
gives a finite limit on the returns due to knowledge creation investments.
Propositions 1a and 1b complement TCE by aiding in the identification of the most
preferred value of current knowledge creation investments that the follower determines. This
information can be used to identify the total resource commitments that are expected to be
required for the project. This can be one of the contractual details that the partnering
organizations agree upon. Similarly, Propositions 2a and 2b complement TCE by providing a
way to arrive at the optimal share of resources that the leader organization is willing to commit
to, given specific values for the performance to investment sensitivity and risk tolerance
parameters. Hence, the current essay provides a way for collaborating organizations to arrive at
the micro level details of the contracts (Krishnan et al., 2001), which is one of the recognized
limitations of economic theories such as TCE.
The results of this essay further complement TCE in that they provide a means for
organizations to follow both cost minimization and profit maximization propositions.
Propositions 1a, 1b, 4a and 4b, when used in combination can guide the collaborating
organizations to arrive at a scheme that reduces transaction costs (current knowledge creation
effort) and maximizes transaction value (expected system gain).

This essay also aids in

modeling the opportunistic behavior of each of the partners. Specifically, in the leader-follower
game, both of the organizations adopt strategies that are guided by opportunism, because the
goal of each organization is to maximize its individual gain. Each organization makes decisions
or adopts strategies that maximize its individual gain. Recall from Section 2.1 that Williamson
(2002) has noted reasons for using multiple theories to supplement TCE in explaining
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phenomena in the organizational knowledge and learning domains. The current essay provides a
game theoretic lens to the understanding of inter-organizational knowledge creation process.
By modeling the relationship as a leader-follower game, the current essay complements
RDT by specifying the strategies that each of the partnering organizations would adopt when in
a relationship where one of the potential partners is expected to have more power over the other.
Recall from the Section 2.1 that the criticism of RDT (Barringer et al., 2000) is that although it
proposes inter-organizational relationships as a viable means to gain access to external
resources, it does not inform one about the details of the strategies that organizations need to
adopt in inter-organizational relationships. The current essay thus complements RDT by
providing the expected strategies of both players in the relationship and setting expectations for
the collaboration.
Modeling the payoff functions for the individual organizations, and for the system gain
as a whole, is a step in the direction that has been recognized as important in the organizational
learning theory literature. The current essay contributes to learning theory by modeling the joint
payoff for both organizations (expected system gain) in addition to focusing on payoffs for
individual organizations (individual expected gains for leader and follower organizations) in the
collaborations, which has been recognized as an important step toward enhancing the theory
(Larsson et al., 1998).
One of the extensions of Essay 2 would be to consider the case in which the leader
organization is characterized by decreasing marginal returns and the follower organization is
characterized by increasing marginal returns (Case 3 of Section 3.3). This case is discussed in
the next sub-section.
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Chapter 6 ESSAY 3: COLLABORATIVE KNOWLEDGE
CREATION AS A LEADER-FOLLOWER GAME- CASE OF
LEADER WITH DECREASING MARGINAL RETURNS AND
FOLLOWER WITH INCREASING MARGINAL RETURNS
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6.1 Introduction to Essay 3
In the third essay, Case 3 presented in Section 3.3 is analyzed and discussed. This is a
mixed case where the leader firm is characterized by decreasing marginal returns with respect to
knowledge creation investments, and the follower organization is characterized by increasing
marginal returns with respect to knowledge creation investments. Thus, the leader organization
is typically an incumbent firm, which engages in incremental innovation. On the other hand, the
follower organization is typically an entrepreneurial firm that engages in radical innovation.
Research partnerships between mature, large pharmaceutical companies and new, small
biotechnology firms, which have recently seen a surge (Audretsch & Feldman, 2003), provide
instances of such collaborations.

The two stages of the game are similar to those specified in

Chapter 5. The equilibrium values of the game are computed by backward induction. Here it is
assumed that the leader organization is risk neutral and the follower organization is risk averse.
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6.2 Collaboration between Organizations with Dissimilar Marginal Return
Functions
GalxoSmithKline (GSK), one of the leading research-based pharmaceutical and
healthcare companies, entered into research partnership with Biosynexus, a private biotechpharmaceutical company (Anonymous, 2002). The research partnership in focus was formed to
co-develop BSYK-A110 and to facilitate the development of a vaccine for new-borns and adults.
This collaboration was intended to engage in product development using Biosynexus’ expertise
in the development of vaccines for prevention and treatment of hospital acquired infections and
GSK’s expertise in developing and marketing biologicals and vaccines. For the purposes of this
essay, GSK is considered the leader organization and Biosynexus is considered to be the
follower.
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6.3 Gain Functions and Equilibrium Values
The performance function P for the leader organization is specified as:

PL (a, c L ) = α − a −γ L c L

−φ L

+ε

where α is the performance asymptote, a is the current knowledge creation effort, γL is
the sensitivity of leader’s performance to current knowledge investment, cL is the leader’s
commercialization capacity, φL is the sensitivity of the performance to leader’s
commercialization capacity, and ε is the error term.
The leader’s expected performance function is specified as:
−φ
PˆL (a, c L ) = α − a −γ L c L L

The performance function P for the follower organization is specified as:

PF ( a, c F ) = a γ F c F

φF

+ε

where a is the current knowledge creation effort, γF is the sensitivity of follower’s
performance to current knowledge investment, cF is the follower’s commercialization capacity,
φF is the sensitivity of the performance to follower’s commercialization capacity and ε is the

error term.
The expected performance function is specified as:
φ
PˆF ( a, c F ) = a γ F c F F

The expected gain function for the leader organization is as follows

πˆ L = ρ L [α − a −γ cL −φ ] − at
L

L

Let L3 = ρ L c L

−φ L

. Then,

πˆ L = ρ Lα − L3 a −γ − at
L

(44)

The expected gain function for the follower organization is as follows:
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πˆ F = ρ F b [a γ c F φ ]b − a(1 − t )
F

(

φ

)

b

Let F3 = ρF cF F . Then,

πˆ F = F3 a γ b − a(1 − t )

(45)

F

where b is the risk tolerance factor as described in Section 4.3. However, the leader
organization is assumed to be risk neutral, and the follower organization is assumed to be risk
averse because the leader’s investment in the current knowledge creation project may be a much
lower proportion of its assets, compared to that of the follower.
The expected system gain:

πˆ = πˆ L + πˆ F = ρ Lα + F3 a γ b − L3 a −γ − a .
F

L

(46)

Note that the discussion about universality of assumptions presented in Section 4.3 still
holds good for this essay.
By setting the first partial derivative of πˆ F with respect to a, to zero, one can determine
the follower’s best response value of the current knowledge creation effort that maximizes the
follower’s expected gain πˆ F as follows:

∂πˆ F
= F3γ F ba γ F b −1 + (1 − t ) = 0
∂a

(47)

Let γ F b = k
The best response value of the current knowledge creation effort as a function of the leader’s
participation rate (t) is as follows:

⎛1− t ⎞
⎟⎟
a * = ⎜⎜
F
k
⎝ 3 ⎠

1
k −1

(48)

102

Given the follower’s best response value of a*, the leader’s best response value for its
participation rate (t) is computed as one that maximizes its expected gain πˆ L . In order to arrive
at the value of t that maximizes πˆ L , the leader’s expected gain function is maximized with
respect to t subject to the constraint in Equation (48).

Max πˆ L = ρ Lα − L3 a *−γ L c F

−φ L

t

− a *t

(49)

subject to the constraint 0 < t < 1 where a* is as expressed in Equation (48).
Substituting the value for a*, as in Equation (48) in Equation (49), gives the optimization
problem for the leader organization as:
−γ L
1
⎛
⎞
k
−
1
k
⎜
⎛ 1 − t ⎞ −1 ⎟
⎛1− t ⎞
⎟ t⎟
⎟ − ⎜⎜
∂⎜ ρ Lα − L3 ⎜⎜
F3 k ⎟⎠
F3 k ⎟⎠
⎝
⎝
⎜
⎟
∂πˆ L
⎝
⎠ =0
=
∂t
∂t

(50)

subject to 0 < t < 1 . By setting the partial derivative of πˆ L in Equation (50), with respect to t,
equal to zero, and solving for t, one gets the general equilibrium condition for the leader’s
participation rate (t) given by:

(1 − t *)

−1

(γ L +1)
⎤
⎡
⎢1 − Z (1 − t*) 1−γ F b ⎥ = γ F b
⎥⎦
⎢⎣

(51)

− (γ L +1)

where Z = L3γ L (F3γ F b ) 1−γ F b .
Equation (51) does not result in a closed form expression for t. However, it gives a lower bound
for the equilibrium value for t, i.e. t3* as:

103

t3 * > 1 −

F3γ F b

(52)

1−γ F b
1+γ L

(L3γ L )

( γ L +1)
⎡
⎤
For the inequality (52) to hold true, ⎢1 − Z (1 − t*) 1−γ F b ⎥ > 0 . If this inequality is violated,
⎢⎣
⎥⎦
( γ L +1)
⎡
⎤
⎢1 − Z (1 − t*) 1−γ F b ⎥ < 0 , which implies that γ F b is negative. γ F b is negative only when γ F is
⎢⎣
⎥⎦

negative. This, in turn, means that the follower exhibits negative performance with increase in
investment a. In such cases, the leader is motivated not to participate. From Equation (51) we
can find the equilibrium value of t3*=t3 such that (1 − t 3 )

−1

(γ L +1)
⎡
⎤
⎢1 − Z (1 − t 3 ) 1−γ F b ⎥ = γ F b .
⎢⎣
⎥⎦

Substituting this value of t3* gives the equilibrium values for the current knowledge creation
effort and the expected system gain for the leader-follower game as shown in Table 8 below.

1

⎛ 1 − t 3 ⎞ γ F b−1
*
⎟⎟
a3 = ⎜⎜
⎝ F3γ F b ⎠
t 3 * = t 3 such that (1 − t 3 )

(53)

−1

( γ L +1)
⎡
⎤
⎢1 − Z (1 − t 3 ) 1−γ F b ⎥ = γ F b
⎢⎣
⎥⎦

⎛ 1 − t3 ⎞
⎟⎟
F
γ
b
⎝ 3 F ⎠

πˆ 3 * = ρ Lα + F3 ⎜⎜

γ Fb
γ F b −1

⎛ 1 − t3 ⎞
⎟⎟
− L3 ⎜⎜
F
γ
b
⎝ 3 F ⎠

−γ L
γ F b −1

(54)

⎛ 1 − t3 ⎞
⎟⎟
− ⎜⎜
F
γ
b
⎝ 3 F ⎠

1

γ F b −1

(55)

Table 8: Equilibrium Values for Leader-Follower Game- Case 3
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6.4 Analysis of Results
An analysis of the previously-stated results leads to the observations that the equilibrium
value for the leader’s participation rate cannot be expressed in a closed form. However, any
value of t that satisfies the condition (1 − t 3 )

−1

(γ L +1)
⎡
⎤
⎢1 − Z (1 − t 3 ) 1−γ F b ⎥ = γ F b can provide an
⎢⎣
⎥⎦

equilibrium value. The values of a3*, t3* and π3* are presented here as functions of γF for
varying values of γL.
The first observation one can make is that a3* is an increasing function of γF as shown in
Figure 10.
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γ F 2.5
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Figure 10: Equilibrium Value of Current Knowledge Creation Effort as a Function of
Follower’s Performance to Investment Sensitivity

Proposition 1: The current knowledge creation effort is an increasing function of
the follower’s performance to investment sensitivity across the values of the
leader’s performance to investment sensitivity. 11
11

Some of the propositions developed in this essay may seem circular with the assumptions made in the essay. An
explanation clarifying the absence of such circularity for Essay 3 is given in Appendix H.
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The proposition stated above implies that the collaborating organizations can use the
follower’s performance to investment sensitivity of current knowledge creation effort to be
informed about the investment to be made in the current knowledge creation project. That is, for
higher promise of performance for the follower, the collaboration invests more in the current
knowledge creation. This implies that as the performance is more sensitive to the current
knowledge creation effort, greater is the investment.
Second, the leader’s participation rate is higher for lower values of the follower’s
performance to investment sensitivity of current knowledge creation efforts. This means that as
the follower’s performance is more sensitive to the total investment in current knowledge

t3*

creation effort, the leader participates less, as shown in Figure 11.

gammaL=.75
gammaL=1
gammaL=2

γF

Figure 11: Equilibrium Value of the Leader's Participation Rate as a Function of
Follower’s Performance to Investment Sensitivity

Proposition 2: The leader’s participation rate is lower for higher values of the
follower’s performance to investment sensitivity across the values of leader’s
performance to investment sensitivity.
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Informed by the above proposition, the leader organization can determine its participation
rate as a function of the follower’s performance to investment sensitivity. For higher values of
the follower organization’s performance to investment sensitivity, the leader will participate less
in the collaboration. The follower organization can also be informed, by the above proposition,
to estimate what the leader’s participation rate will be. Thus, Proposition 2 aids collaborating
organizations in making resource-sharing decisions.
Third, the computation of t3* gives a lower bound for the leader’s participation rate
as t 3 * > 1 −

F3γ F b
1−γ F b
1+γ L

(L3γ L )

between 1 and 1 −

. That is, when the equilibrium value for the leader’s participation rate is

F3γ F b
1−γ F b
1+γ L

(L3γ L )

then the collaboration exists.

Proposition 3: The collaboration exists only when the solution to the equation
(γ L +1)
⎡
⎤
Fγ b
−1
(1 − t *) ⎢1 − Z (1 − t*) 1−γ F b ⎥ = γ F b is between 1 and1 − 3 F1−γ F b .
⎢⎣
⎥⎦
(L3γ L ) 1+γ L

The leader’s participation rate below this lower bound is possible only when the follower
exhibits negative returns for increase in investment. In such cases, the leader is not motivated to
participate, and hence the collaboration does not exist. This lower bound for the leader’s
participation rate equips the follower with a decision aid during the partner selection stage of the
alliance formation.
Fourth, the equilibrium value of the leader’s expected gain is a monotonically increasing
function of the follower’s performance to investment sensitivity as shown in Figure 12.
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π L3 ∗
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Figure 12: Equilibrium Value of Leader’s Expected Gain as a Function of Follower’s
Performance to Investment Sensitivity

Additionally, the equilibrium value of the follower’s expected gain is a monotonically
decreasing function of the follower’s performance to investment sensitivity as shown in Figure
13.

π F3*

gammaL=0.5
gammaL=1
gammaL=2

γF

Figure 13: Equilibrium Value of Follower's Expected Gain as a Function of Follower's
Performance to Investment Sensitivity
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Proposition 4a: The equilibrium value of the leader’s expected gain
monotonically increases as a function of the follower’s performance to investment
sensitivity across the values of leader’s performance to investment sensitivity.
Proposition 4b: The equilibrium value of the follower’s expected gain
monotonically decreases as a function of the follower’s performance to
investment sensitivity across the values of leader’s performance to investment
sensitivity.

This means that for higher values of the follower’s performance to investment sensitivity
of current knowledge creation effort, the leader’s expected gain is higher, and the follower’s
expected gain is lower.

The collaborating organizations can be informed by the above

propositions in gauging what to anticipate in terms of their expected gains. Recall from
Proposition 1 that for higher values of γF, the value the current knowledge creation effort
increases. Additionally, recall from Proposition 2 that for higher values of γF, the values of the
leader’s participation rate decreases. Hence, the collaborating organization can be informed by
Propositions 1, 2, 4a and 4b while making decisions about how much investment they should
expend in order to get the desired expected gains.

Specifically, the collaboration might prove

more advantageous to the leader than the follower because as the performance becomes more
sensitive to the follower’s investment, the leader organization participates less and has a higher
expected gain.
Finally, an examination of the relation between the equilibrium value of the expected
system gain and the follower’s performance to investment sensitivity reveals that for lower
values of the leader’s performance to investment sensitivity, the relation is non-monotonic. That
is, for lower values of γL, π3* is a non-monotonic function of γF. This leads to an interesting
observation that the system gain is lower for moderate values of γF as shown in Figure 14.
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Figure 14: Equilibrium Value of Expected System Gain as a Function of Follower's
Performance to Investment Sensitivity for Several Values of Leader's Performance to
Investment Sensitivity.

Proposition 5a: The relation between the equilibrium value of expected system
gain and the follower’s performance to investment sensitivity is non-monotonic
for lower values of the leader’s performance to investment sensitivity.
Proposition 5b: The equilibrium value of expected system gain monotonically
increases with the follower’s performance to investment sensitivity for higher
values of the leader’s performance to investment sensitivity.

Note how the equilibrium value of expected system gain is a monotonically increasing
function of the follower’s performance to investment sensitivity for the leader’s performance to
investment sensitivity values of 1 and 2. This means that when the leader’s performance is less
sensitive to the investment, as the follower’s sensitivity increases, the expected system gain first
decreases, then increases.

This is an interesting observation (Davis, 1971) because it has

implications for identifying the conditions under which the collaboration is beneficial to the
follower and the leader.

For instance, when the follower’s performance is less sensitive to

investment, the follower might be at more advantageous position than the leader since the
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follower’s expected gain is higher than the leader’s expected gain. However, as the follower’s
sensitivity increases, the follower’s expected gain decreases and the leader’s gain increases.
Hence, the follower is in an advantageous position when both its sensitivity and the leader’s
sensitivity are low. This has implications for the follower organization in terms of deciding on a
preferred partner.
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6.5 Discussion
In the third essay, I provide a framework for studying resource-sharing between two
organizations engaged in collaborative knowledge creation. The collaboration is modeled as a
Stackelberg Leader-Follower game between two organizations where the leader organization is
characterized by decreasing marginal returns and the follower organization is characterized by
increasing marginal returns. The equilibrium values for the current knowledge creation effort,
the leader’s participation rate, and the total system gain are analyzed.
The computation of Nash equilibrium for the game reveals that the equilibrium value of
the leader’s participation rate cannot be expressed in a closed form. The equilibrium values
presented here are contingent upon the condition that (1 − t 3 )

−1

(γ L +1)
⎡
⎤
1−γ b
⎢1 − Z (1 − t 3 ) F ⎥ = γ F b . An
⎣⎢
⎦⎥

examination of the relation between the follower’s performance to investment sensitivity of
current knowledge creation effort and the equilibrium values, reveals that the current knowledge
creation effort is an increasing function of the follower’s performance to investment sensitivity;
while the leader’s participation rate is a decreasing function of the follower’s performance to
investment sensitivity, across several values of leader’s performance to investment sensitivity.
However, the expected system gain is an increasing function of the follower’s performance to
investment sensitivity for higher values of leader’s performance to investment sensitivity. It
first decreases, and then increases, for higher values of leader’s performance to investment
sensitivity.
With respect to collaborations for knowledge creation, the propositions made here have
implications from several vantage points, ranging from establishing the condition under which
the leader is motivated to collaborate and hence for explaining the conditions under which
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collaborations exist to comparing potential partners. For instance, informed by Proposition 3,
the leader and follower organizations can identify one condition under which the collaboration is
possible. The lower bound for the leader’s participation rate reveals the condition for the leader
to be motivated to form the collaboration, answering the third research question about the
conditions for the existence of the collaboration. Additionally, the lower bound for the leader’s
participation rate informs the leader about the minimum share of its investment, if it were to
reap the benefits of collaboration. Further, Propositions 4a and 4b inform the organizations that
the expected system gain is a non-monotonic function of the follower’s sensitivity for low
values of the leader’s sensitivity. This finding answers the second research question about the
conditions under which some potential partners become more attractive than others. For the
follower organization, a potential partner with high performance to investment sensitivity
becomes more attractive than one with the low value of the same parameter.
Proposition 2 specifies that the leader’s participation rate depends on the follower’s
performance to investment sensitivity, and it decreases as a function of the parameter. This
answers the first research question as to the factors that determine the leader’s participation rate
and how they influence the leader’s participation rate. Thus, while evaluating potential partners,
the leader organization might consider partnering with an organization with high performance to
investment sensitivity, since it can get away with participating less. On the other hand, a higher
performance to investment sensitivity means that the current knowledge creation effort and the
system gain are higher. Hence, by choosing a partner with high values of performance to
investment sensitivity parameter, the leader organization can ensure high levels of current
knowledge creation investment, higher system gain (provided its own performance to
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investment sensitivity is higher) and a lower participation rate. Thus the current essay has
implications for practice and answers three of four research questions.
The above observations also have important implications for research.

This essay

provides an insight into how the collaborations between organizations with different marginal
return functions - a case that is widely observed in the biotechnology–pharmaceutical alliances –
can be modeled as leader-follower games and how they compare to the collaborations between
organizations characterized by decreasing marginal returns as well as collaborations of firms
characterized by increasing marginal returns. Furthermore, the non-monotonic behavior of the
expected system gain for low values of the leader’s performance to investment sensitivity poses
a fertile line of future investigation.
The contributions of the current essay to specific theories are as follows. Recall from
Section 2.1 that the two main ways in which TCE falls short in explaining collaborations are
with regard to arriving at the micro level details of contracts (Krishnan et al., 2001) and with
regard to ignoring the value maximization proposition, which is important for knowledge
creation (Dyer, 1997) and the general conduct of business (Coase, 1988). Proposition 1
complements TCE by aiding in the identification of the most preferred value of the current
knowledge creation investments that the follower determines. This information can be used to
identify the total resource commitments that are expected to be required for the project. This is
one of the details of the contract that needs to be agreed upon by the collaborating organizations
and included in the contract. Similarly, Proposition 2 complements TCE by providing a way to
arrive at the optimal share of resources that the leader organization is willing to commit to,
given specific values for the follower’s performance to investment sensitivity. This is the other
detail that is included during designing the contract.

114

Additionally, the interesting observation about the relationship between expected system
gain and the follower’s performance to investment sensitivity, for lower levels of leader’s
performance to investment sensitivity, highlight another important way in which the current
essay complements TCE. This finding reiterates the importance of focus on value maximization
(Dyer, 1997).
Recall from Section 2.1 that the main way in which RDT falls short in explaining interorganizational collaborations is that it does not explain the specific strategies that firms devise
while engaging in inter-organizational collaborations, in order to gain access to resources
available within the environment (Barringer et al., 2000). Such strategies could include partner
selection strategies. Specifically, in relation to deciding which of the potential partners is
suitable for collaboration, when informed by the current essay, the leader organization can
choose a partner with greater performance to investment sensitivity, provided its own
performance to investment sensitivity is high. Furthermore, the follower organization, based on
its own performance to investment sensitivity, and informed by the Propositions 2, 4a and 4b,
can choose leader partners that will provide a good mix of participation rate and expected
system gain. Note that the system gain is an additive of the individual expected gains.
With respect to organizational learning theory, the current essay contributes by modeling
the payoff functions for the individual organizations and for the system. This is recognized as
an important learning outcome for collaborations that warrants further study (Larsson et al.,
1998). The current essay contributes to learning theory by modeling the joint payoff for both of
the organizations (expected system gain) in addition to focusing on payoffs for individual
organizations (individual expected gains for leader and follower organizations) in the
collaborations.
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Chapter 7 CROSS-ESSAY ANALYSIS OF RESULTS
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7.1 Cross-essay Comparisons and Contrasts
In this section, I compare and contrast the results of the analyses presented for Essay 1,
Essay 2 and Essay 3. Specific comparisons of the equilibrium values are not permissible given
that the parameters used in the performance functions in the three essays are markedly different.
However, some general comparisons and contrasts are attempted.
Recollect that Essay 1 consists of the relationship between two firms characterized by
decreasing marginal returns with respect to knowledge creation investments, modeled as a
cooperative game via the partnership game. In Essay 2, the relationship between both of the
firms characterized by increasing marginal returns, is modeled as a non-cooperative game via the
leader-follower game. Essay 3 also models the relationship as a leader-follower game, but the
leader organization is characterized by decreasing marginal returns, and the follower
organization is characterized by increasing marginal returns. Since the characteristics of the
organizations, in terms of their marginal return functions, and the type of game used to model the
relationship – partnership or leader-follower- are markedly different across the three essays, the
comparisons and contrasts are discussed for Essays 2 and 3. Additionally, the results of the
background work discussed in Chapter 3 are used to compare and contrast with the results of
Essay 1 and Essay 3.
Essay 2 and Essay 3 are amenable for comparison and contrasts because they have
commonalities in terms of the non-cooperative relationship. Essay 1 is compared and contrasted
with the background work because, although the relationships were modeled as different games
(partnership in Essay 1 and leader-follower in background work), the collaborating firms are
characterized by similar marginal return functions. Both organizations in these relationships are
characterized by decreasing marginal returns. Essay 3 is then compared with the background
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work because the relationship is modeled as a leader-follower model in both of these cases, and
the leader organization is characterized by decreasing marginal return function.
The similarity between Essay 2 and Essay 3 is that the equilibrium value of current
knowledge creation effort increases with an increase in the performance to investment
sensitivity. That is, with promise of better performance, the amount of investment that the
collaboration, as a whole, makes toward the current knowledge creation project increases. This
similarity has implications for collaborating organizations because the organizations can be
assured that under different types of relationships, the main factor that determines the level of
current knowledge creation effort is the performance to investment sensitivity rather than the
behavior of the partner.
Contrasting Essays 2 and 3, the leader’s participation rate increases as the performance to
investment sensitivity increases in Essay 2, while in Essay 3, it decreases as the follower’s
performance to investment sensitivity increases.
selection in the following ways.

This contrast has implications for partner

An organization in the follower’s position is better off

collaborating with an organization in the leader’s position, when the leader’s performance
function is characterized by increasing marginal returns, with respect to knowledge creation
investments when the performance to investment sensitivity is high. Conversely, the follower
organization is better off collaborating with a leader organization whose performance function is
characterized by decreasing marginal returns with respect to knowledge creation investments,
when the performance to investment sensitivity is low.
Another contrast between Essay 2 and Essay 3 is that both essays have a condition under
which the collaboration exists. However, the difference between these conditions is that for
Essay 2, the condition is with respect to the ratio of the leader’s revenue term to the follower’s
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revenue term, and for Essay 3 the condition for the collaboration gives the minimal value of the
leader’s participation rate beyond which the leader’s participation rate is zero. For the follower
organization, this implies that irrespective of the leader organization’s marginal return function,
there are conditions for the existence of the collaboration. Further, these conditions highlight the
specific parameters that the follower organization should consider while attempting to choose
between potential partners.
The last contrast between Essay 2 and Essay 3 is that the relationship between expected
system gain and the follower’s performance to investment sensitivity in Essay 3 exhibits
different behavior for different values of the leader’s performance to investment sensitivity. For
instance, for low values of the leader’s performance to investment sensitivity, the above
relationship is non-monotonic. On the other hand, in Essay 2, the relationship between the
expected system gain and the performance to investment sensitivity is a monotonically
increasing one. This contrast implies that when the follower organization chooses a partner, it
needs to pay attention to the performance to investment sensitivity of the leader organization.
The follower organization is better off choosing a partner with a higher value, especially when
the leader organization is characterized by decreasing marginal returns.
The similarity between the background work and Essay 1 is that the relations between the
parameters in the equilibrium values remain the same, with or without prior knowledge. For
instance, the relationship between the leader’s participation rate and the gain to performance
ratios remains the same across scenarios in the background work, as does the relationship
between participation rate, the risk tolerance, and bargaining power parameters.

This implies

that no matter how the relationship is modeled, the organizations having made some prior
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investments in knowledge creation activities does not influence the factors that determine the
participation rate.
Contrasting Essay 1 with the background work, one can infer that while the leader’s
participation rate is a function of the leader’s and follower’s gain to performance ratio in the
background work, it is a function of risk tolerance and bargaining power in Essay 1. The
implication of this observation is that when the goal of the collaboration is to maximize the
system gain, the organizations need to consider factors that are external to the model, such as risk
tolerance and bargaining power, while making the resource-sharing decisions. Thus, the goal of
the collaboration, as the relationship is modeled, plays an important part in determining the
factors that influence the resource-sharing decisions.
A comparison and contrast of Essay 3 with the background work leads to the following
observations. The first similarity is that in both cases there are specific conditions for the
existence of the collaborations. Specifically, the conditions for the leader’s participation rate
become conditions under which the collaborations exist.

For the leader organization, this

similarity implies that, irrespective of the nature of the follower organization’s marginal return
function, the leader organization can still identify the conditions of its participation rate for the
collaboration to exist.
The contrast between the background work and Essay 3 is that the leader’s participation
rate is a function of the follower’s performance to investment sensitivity in Essay 3; whereas, it
is a function of the leader’s and follower’s gain to performance ratios in the background work.
That is, when the firms in the collaboration have dissimilar marginal return functions, the
leader’s participation rate depends on the follower-specific parameter; whereas, when the firms
in the collaboration have similar marginal return functions, the leader’s participation rate
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depends on the parameters specific to both the leader and the follower. Additionally, this contrast
also highlights that when the firms have similar marginal return functions, the leader’s
participation rate depends on the gain to performance ratios; while in the other case, it depends
on how sensitive the performance is to the investment. This implies that in the case of similar
marginal return functions, the leader focuses more on the firms’ relative ability to appropriate
knowledge while deciding on the participation rate. On the other hand, in case of dissimilar
return functions, the leader focuses on the way the investments transform into performance,
while deciding on the participation rate. This, in turn, educates the leader organization to align
priorities depending on the potential follower organization’s marginal return functions.
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7.2 A Note on the Generalizability of Results
In this sub-section, I address the issue of generalizability of the results of this thesis to
other contexts. In doing so, I rely on the generalizability framework provided by Lee and
Baskerville (2003) to discuss the applicability of the results of the thesis to other settings.
Specifically, two of the four types of generalizations presented by Lee and Baskerville (2003)
take relevance with respect to this thesis- theory to empirical (TE) generalizations and theory to
theory (TT) generalizations. For instance, they identify the TE generalization as the extension of
the theoretical concepts to contexts other than the one in which the theory has been developed
and tested. Given that the essays in this thesis focus on theory development and not on testing
the theory, the generalizability of the results presented in this dissertation to other empirical
settings is unclear at this point. In this regard, the constraints within which the results of these
essays can be applied to other contexts can be determined only after the conduct of a thorough
empirical study that would ultimately refine and test the theoretical claims made in this thesis.
However, the results of the essays discussed in the current dissertation complement other
theories that explain the formation and popularity of alliances and hence contribute to the
synthesis of alliance literature which Lee and Baskerville (2003) qualify as a TT generalization.
For instance, the results of this work complement TCE and RDT by providing a way of arriving
at the details of the contracts and by providing a guide to formulate strategies for the several
stages of collaboration. Thus, these results contribute toward synthesizing the alliance literature
by filling the gap left behind by a few theories that are discussed here and explaining the
dynamics that take place within alliances.
On the other hand, while the results of the thesis do contribute toward filling gaps in the
alliance literature, one still needs to exercise caution while generalizing the findings across
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different types of alliances. For instance, in their review of inter-organizational relationships
literature, Barringer and Harrison (2000) identified six types of inter-organizational
relationships: joint ventures; networks (bound by social, rather than legal contracts); consortia;
alliances; trade associations; and interlocking directorates. Out of these six types of interorganizational relationships, the results of the current thesis are relevant to joint ventures and
alliances, only when the relationship is between a dyad of firms. Also, as mentioned in Section
4.3, the current results are only applicable when the focus of the collaboration is joint knowledge
creation. When expanding the results to other collaborations, where the primary focus is not
knowledge creation, it is essential that the current model be expanded to include the
characteristics specific to the goal of the collaboration. Additionally, as explained in Section 3.1,
when there is sufficient reason to believe that the new context is characterized by irrationality,
incomplete or imperfect information, or a combination of all, the results of this study cannot be
applied without altering the mathematical models used in this thesis.
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Chapter 8 CONCLUSION
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8.1 Summary
The current research analyzes the resource-sharing decision-making process in
collaborative knowledge creation from a game theoretic perspective. Specifically, two games are
discussed - the partnership game and the leader-follower game. Under the partnership game, the
marginal return curve with respect to knowledge creation investment is specified as decreasing
for both of the firms; and under the leader-follower game, two cases are modeled in Essays 2 and
3. Essay 2 is modeled with both of the organizations characterized by increasing marginal
returns with respect to knowledge creation investment. In Essay 3, the collaboration is modeled
as a leader-follower game, with leader firm being characterized by decreasing marginal returns
with respect to knowledge creation investment, and the follower firm being characterized by
increasing marginal returns with respect to knowledge creation investment.

The Nash

equilibrium values were derived for the partnership game and for both of the cases under the
leader-follower game. These equilibrium values were further analyzed to have implications for
several stages of collaboration, ranging from partner selection to continuance of the
collaboration.
The observations drawn from the results of the partnership game in Chapter 4 have
important implications for practice and research. In practice, organizations can be informed that
having some prior investment in knowledge creation, either by means of experience or prior
efforts, is better because of cost, infrastructure, negative knowledge, development speed
advantage, etc., (Cohen et al., 1990) because such prior efforts make organizations more
attractive potential partners. This extends the current understanding that prior experience leads
to greater absorptive capacity. As organizations explore ways to collaborate, they would be
better off choosing partners who have made some investments toward knowledge creation. This
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has implications for partner selection, which was one of the research questions posed in the
Introduction.
Organizations can use information on potential partners’ demonstrated risk tolerance as
an indicator of their participation rate in the current endeavor. Similarly, organizations can
gauge their potential partners’ bargaining power and anticipate the preferred participation rate of
their partners. Using this information on relative risk tolerance and relative bargaining powers,
organizations can create a portfolio of potential partners and anticipate their moves in partnership
games. Thus the model presented here provides guidelines for decision makers about investment
and partner selection for knowledge creation, which is the essence of the second research
question.
The research provides a foundation for exploring the dynamics of collaborative
relationships, especially when the collaboration results in new product development or product
and process improvements, as opposed to licensing, marketing or distribution collaborations. It
focuses attention on factors that are not included in the response function (risk tolerance and
bargaining power) that influence an organization’s resource commitment in collaboration. This
answers the first research question about the factors that might have an influence on the
participation rate. In Essay 1, such factors are identified as risk tolerance and bargaining power.
Essay 2 models the collaborative relationship as a leader-follower game with both of the
collaborating firms being characterized by increasing marginal returns with respect to knowledge
creation investment.

This essay draws attention to the conditions under which the leader

organization participates in the collaboration. The results show that the equilibrium values of the
current knowledge creation effort, leader’s participation rate, and the system gain are functions
of the follower’s performance to investment sensitivity of current knowledge creation effort and
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risk tolerance. Specifically, the equilibrium values of the current knowledge creation effort and
system gain increase monotonically for higher values of the follower’s performance to
investment sensitivity and risk tolerance. Similarly, the values for the participation increase as a
function of the follower’s performance to investment sensitivity and risk tolerance. The results
inform the potential partners in setting expectations from the collaboration. In particular, the
equilibrium condition concerning the ratio of the leader term to the follower term (

L2
) specifies
F2

the condition for existence of the collaboration. Such conditions discussed in the analysis of case
2 answer the research question about the conditions for the collaborations to exist and
subsequently for the determination of the leader’s participation rate.
Essay 3 is concerned with collaborations where the leader organization is characterized
by decreasing marginal returns with respect to knowledge creation investment; and the follower
organization is characterized by increasing marginal returns with respect to knowledge creation
investment.

The role of the follower’s performance to investment sensitivity of current

knowledge creation efforts on all the key equilibrium values was observed. This analysis
revealed that the current knowledge creation effort increases as a function of follower’s
performance to investment sensitivity across the several values of leader’s performance to
investment sensitivity (γL).

The leader’s participation rate decreases as a function of the

follower’s performance to investment sensitivity over several values of leader’s performance to
investment sensitivity (γL). The leader’s expected gain increases monotonically as a function of
the follower’s performance to investment sensitivity and the follower’s expected gain decreases
monotonically as a function of the follower’s performance to investment sensitivity.
The cross essay analysis revealed that an organization in the follower position is better
off collaborating with an organization with increasing marginal returns than that with decreasing
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marginal returns under conditions of high risk tolerance. This result makes an initial attempt at
answering the research question about the preference of marginal return functions in choosing
partners.
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8.2 Contributions to Literature
This work enhances the current understanding of the organization science, information
systems, alliance, and decision analysis literature streams.

First, this study enhances the

knowledge management and organizational learning literature by addressing knowledge creation.
Knowledge management literature recognizes that there have been more studies on knowledge
transfer and retention than those that address knowledge creation (Argote, 1999; Argote,
McEvily, & Reagans, 2003a). For instance, Argote (1999) noted that,
“We know relatively more about knowledge retention and transfer than we know
about knowledge creation in organizations.” pp. 203.

Additionally, the study focuses on the dynamics of knowledge creation alliance and on
the negotiation process, while making decisions regarding each organization’s participation in
the endeavor, as well as, its share of the gains. Although prior studies have noted that cost
sharing is one of the motives for the formation of R&D or knowledge creation alliances, the
current study enhances this understanding by answering the question of “how” these resources
are shared. Also, the current study answers the question of “what determines” the resource
participation rate.
In relation to the variables included in the study, this work is in line with the future
directions for knowledge management research laid out in recent literature. For instance, Argote
et al. (2003b) recently noted that dyadic research could investigate the influence of variables
such as power and conflict on knowledge management outcomes. This study addresses the need
for such new variables in knowledge management literature by answering the research question
raised as to what factors determine the resource-sharing rates of the partner firms and how do
they affect the resource-sharing rate. However, I recognize that I provide game theoretic factors
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that affect the participation rate. There might be other factors contributed by other theoretical
lenses that aid in determining the resource participation rate of the organizations. For instance,
Heiman and Nickerson (2002) noted that knowledge attributes, such as tacitness, determine the
knowledge management practices adopted in inter-firm alliances and hence determine the choice
of governance structure. They argue that such knowledge management practices including
collaborative knowledge creation determine whether the chosen governance structure – equitybased alliance or non equity-based alliance – is adopted.
Second, viewing alliances as games between partnering organizations is a contribution to
the growing literature, which applies game theory to understand the dynamics of collaborations.
Alliances have been examined from several theoretical viewpoints such as transaction cost
economics, resource dependency theory, and organizational learning theory (Barringer et al.,
2000). However, studies that have viewed alliances as games are rare, and this study provides a
viable theoretical lens to understand the resource-sharing decision-making process. Additionally,
this study contributes to the alliance literature in terms of adding risk propensity and bargaining
power as two additional criteria - as informed by the application of game theory - to be
considered during the partner selection phase of alliance management. Such consideration of
bargaining power and risk propensity adds to the currently prevalent factors for partner selection
identified in literature (Hitt et al., 2000). Some of the other factors are goal congruence between
potential partners, level of cultural compatibility, political support for the alliance within the
partners’ hierarchy, and resource complementarity (Doz et al., 1998; Sinha & Cusumano, 1991;
Spekman, Forbes III, Isabella, & MacAvoy, 1998).
In relation to TCE, this study takes the main tenets of the theory that are proposed at the
macro level and presents a bridge that managers can use to put the principles of TCE into
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practice.

Game theory, in particular complements TCE by allowing the organizations to

explicitly model the decision-making process of the contract details and accommodating the
changes that unfold during the relationship. Additionally, as expected, game theory allows
modeling the collaborative relationship as a value maximization proposition, in addition to a cost
minimization proposition, by enabling the specification of payoffs and investments.
Similarly, the current work enhances the resource dependency theory (RDT) by extending
its recommendation that organizations need to devise strategies to manage dependencies by
claiming ownership over the knowledge produced and by agreeing on a participation rate. Game
theory allows one to model the collaboration as a relationship, and a similar analysis can be
conducted at subsequent stages when the dependencies between the organizations, and hence
their individual behaviors, change.
The current study encourages the shift in the information systems (IS) field’s focus from
“techno-centric” to a “technology/organizational/management/social focus,” which makes IS a
reference discipline (Baskerville & Myers, 2002) rather than a discipline safe in its silo. Such
expansion in focus is important to improve the applicability of the concepts developed in the IS
discipline to explain processes outside of its general lines of inquiry.
In relation to the IS literature, the contributions of this study are manifold. First, similar to
the recognition in the learning theory literature, there is a recognition in the IS literature that
there is a need to focus attention on the knowledge generation and realization processes and on
exploring the relationship between strategy and knowledge processes (Grover & Davenport,
2001).

This study contributes to IS literature by addressing knowledge generation and

realization. By focusing on knowledge creation collaborations, this study enhances the current
understanding of inter-organizational knowledge management. The inter-organizational focus of
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this study is a step in the direction of developing inter-organizational systems for facilitating the
joint creation of knowledge. Also, the gain to performance ratio parameter used in the model is
an explicit attempt to incorporate the extent to which an organization realizes gain from the
knowledge created.
Second, knowledge creation has been the target of recent studies (Ravichandran & Rai,
2003). However, such studies focus more on the impact of the knowledge created in achieving
outcomes for the organizations – that is on the post knowledge creation stage - and on translating
the knowledge created into performance improvements or capability accumulation for the
organizations. The current study enhances the understanding of the knowledge creation process
itself by unveiling the dynamics involved in this complex process, how those dynamics might
impact how organizations realize the value of the knowledge created. By specifying the
relationship between investments and payoffs in the production function, this study has provided
a ground for modeling inter-organizational knowledge creation relationships from a value
creation and gain maximization viewpoint.
Third, recent advances with respect to knowledge accumulation have identified three types
of learning processes - learning-by-investment, learning-by-doing and learning-from-othersthrough which organizations accumulate knowledge (Ryu, Kim, Chaudhury, & Rao, 2005). One
of the fundamental limitations of the referenced study is that it considers the three types of
learning as independent of each other, which is suitable for the study of individuals. However, in
an inter-organizational knowledge creation context, there is a necessity to consider these three
types of learning in conjunction with one another. For instance, in dyadic knowledge creation
collaboration, it is more likely that the collaborating organizations make joint investments, learn
from one another and other sources external to the dyad, and also accumulate knowledge by
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doing. This study enhances this current stream of IS literature by considering the creation of
knowledge as a result of joint investments and building on the prior knowledge available with
each partner.
The study contributes to the alliance literature in the following ways. First, this study
focuses on the dynamics that unfold before the formation of the collaboration that eventually
lead to the contractual agreements between the partners.

Next, this study focuses on the

collaborative relationship as a unit of analysis, which has been particularly stressed upon as
important by the learning theory literature (Dyer et al., 1998; Larsson et al., 1998).
The current study contributes to the decision analysis literature in the following ways.
First, it augments the current work in the growing application area of decision modeling interorganizational behavior under the realm of knowledge management and supply chain
management literature (de Cesare & di Liddo, 2001; Li, 2002; Rogers, 2001). The application of
concepts such as game theory, to other new literatures such as knowledge management, has been
recently recognized as one of the ways decision analysis literature is extended (Clemen &
Kleinmuntz, 2004).

Specifically, the current study models the relationship between

organizations as games between players and provides a way to model the decision-making
process as a game comprised of strategies that players can follow with payoffs for the players.
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8.3 Limitations
The first limitation of this study is that only continuous return functions are included, not
the discontinuous. For instance, if one considers the creation of knowledge, which results in a
single product, the knowledge creation investment may not yield any return until the product is
complete, at which stage there is a sudden increase in return as shown in the Figure 16. Until the
knowledge creation investment reaches $M there is no return (R=0), and from then onwards, the
organization starts to realize a return starting from $N. In contrast, if one considers the creation
of knowledge that results in a performance improvement, as could be the case with the CobbDouglas function, the return due to increase in the investment a increases continuously as in
Figure 15 rather than discretely as in Figure 16. For the purpose of this dissertation, I assume
that the return function is continuous.

Revenue
Revenue
N

0

0

KC
M Investment

KC Investment

Figure 16: Continuous Function

Figure 16: Discontinuous Function

A second limitation of this study, by virtue of applying game theory is that it assumes
that the collaborating organizations are rational actors. Additionally, complete and perfect
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information about each others’ moves and intentions is assumed. However in reality, this
assumption may not hold true (Samuelson, 2002). One or both of the organizations may neither
behave rationally nor may have complete, perfect information about the partner’s preferences. In
such cases, the relationship cannot be modeled as the games presented here, since the
assumptions of perfect and complete information have to be true, in order to be able to arrive at
the Nash equilibrium.
The third limitation is that this study includes only those collaborations that are expected
to generate financial gains. However, collaborations may not always succeed, and this study
does not accommodate or explain collaborations that failed to perform. For instance, if one
considers the net present value (NPV) of the partnering firms as an indicator of performance
(Tallon, Kauffman, Lucas, Whinston, & Zhu, 2002), when firms experience negative NPV, most
firms consider that as a signal to discontinue investment. However, sometimes negative NVP
could still generate potentially valuable options in future (Kambil, Henderson, & Mohsenzadeh,
1993).
The fourth limitation of this study is that several variables that might influence the
resource-sharing decision-making process have not been included in the model. For instance,
literature on inter-organizational networks has recognized the importance of variables such as
trust (Parker, 2005; Welty & Becerra-Fernandez, 2001) in determining the extent of resourcesharing specifically information sharing. For instance, in relation to resource-sharing in keiretsu
members, Parker (2005) noted that trust and commitment generated through ongoing close
relationships among the members lead to the development of resource-sharing mechanisms.
Trust can be built within a network of organizations by repeat collaborations with the same
partner (Gulati, 1995a; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999).
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8.4 Directions for Future Research
The current research could be further extended along the three directions of mathematical
extensions, theoretical extensions and extensions informed by practice.
Along the direction of enhancing the mathematical model, the following are identified as
directions for future research. First, as noted in Section 7.3, one of the limitations of the current
work is its exclusion of discontinuous production functions. Discontinuous production function
could be target of future work.

Similarly, a natural extension of this work would be to

understand the collaborations reporting negative NPV from a real options perspective. As noted
in the introduction, collaborations with negative returns have been excluded from this study, yet
there is enough evidence in the literature that collaborations with negative returns continue to
invest in anticipation of future returns.
Additionally, the type of knowledge created can determine the nature of the performance
function. For instance, if the collaboration is engaged in building a competency that is easily
imitable by other firms or collaborations, then the performance function is likely to be of an
inverted U shape (Onyeiwu, 2003). The current work also needs to be extended to include
collaborations with such performance functions and determine why collaborations would
continue to invest in collaborations.
Further, another way to model the four collaborations specified in this dissertation would
be to specify the return functions for the collaborating organizations as portions of a unified
logistic function such as the Gompertz (1825) logistic curve. This would be a more unified
approach to the specification of the return functions, in contrast to the separate treatment of the
performance functions based on Cobb-Douglas function and the sales response volume function.
This becomes another direction for future study.
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Theoretical extensions of the current work include modeling collaboration under the
assumptions of incomplete information or imperfect information or both. Such collaborations
could be modeled as games that allow for the presence of imperfect and incomplete information
and equilibrium other than Nash equilibrium could be arrived at.

Collaborations under

assumptions of incomplete information can be modeled as Bayesian games (Harsanyi, 1967);
and those with imperfect information can be modeled along the lines of von Neumann and
Morgenstern’s (1953) classic work Additionally, alternative ways of modeling the possibility of
irrational behavior, such as including biases in the model (Wade-Benzoni et al., 2002), could be
explored in future.
Variables that might have influence on the collaboration dynamics such as trust, due to
prior association, could be included in the model in another possible theoretical extension. If
trust were to be included in the model, prior relationship with the same partner – operationalized
as partner-specific alliance experience (Gulati et al., 1999; Hoang et al., 2005) – is a suitable
variable to be included in future research.
Appropriation concerns are well-documented in literature (Cohen, 1998; Hunoley,
Jacobson, & Park, 1996) and deserve much detailed treatment. The necessity to appropriate the
new knowledge produced can have an effect on the type of governance structure that is used for
the inter-organizational relationship. For instance, Duysters and Hagedoorn (2002) note that the
governance structures adopted by an inter-organizational relationship - either strategic
partnerships, mergers and acquisitions or mixed structures - depend on the appropriability regime
of the organization. Although the capacity of the organization to commercialize new knowledge
has been modeled as a parameter in Essays 2 and 3, no significant results were derived as
function of this parameter. Another extension of the current study would be to investigate the
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influence of the organizations’ commercialization capacities on the current knowledge creation
effort, participation rate and the expected system gain.
Additionally, note that the current thesis models Cases 2, 3, and 5 presented in Section
3.3. This thesis builds on the background work that examines relationships illustrative of Case 1.
Hence, a natural theoretical extension of the current work would be to examine the relationships
modeled as Cases 4, 6 and 7.
The third direction along which the current work could be extended is with respect to the
observations made in literature about growing trends in supply chain management practices. For
instance, in a supply network (Choi, Dooley, & Rungtusanatham, 2001; Choi et al., 2002) where
typically more than two organizations are involved, relationships are bound to become more
complex; and therefore, studying the dynamics of the relationships in a supply network appears
to be an important direction for future research. Specifically such relationships could comprise
those between one buyer and many suppliers (1 to n) (Li, 2002) or within a network of suppliers
and buyers (m to n) (Choi et al., 2002). Such many-to-many relationships can be studied when a
few of the partners form a coalition, or as those where all of the collaborating organizations
operate as a coalition.
The current study can also be extended to model collaborations whose primary objective
is not knowledge creation. For instance, when collaborations are formed for the purpose of
accessing each other’s distribution channels or market segments, this model might still be
applicable, however with modification. For instance, in a collaboration that is formed for the
development of a non-knowledge asset or a tangible asset, depreciation of assets has to be
factored into the current model to account for the difference between the tangible assets and
knowledge. Additionally, when collaborations are formed between organizations with prior
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complementary knowledge, such knowledge has to be factored in – as was done in Scenario 2 of
Essay 1. Thus, an additional direction for future research would be to extend this model to
include a combination of knowledge and non-knowledge assets.
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Appendix A: Essay 1 Symbols and their Descriptions
Symbol

P
P̂
a

α

γ

ε
ρ1
ρ2
πˆ1
πˆ 2

πˆ
t
q1
q2

δ1

δ2

Description

Performance due to knowledge creation investments
Expected performance
Total current knowledge creation effort (total dollar amount expended by both of
the organizations in the collaboration exclusively toward the current project)
Performance saturation asymptote (limit on the performance improvements that can
occur due to knowledge created)
Performance to investment sensitivity for the current knowledge creation effort
(percentage change in revenue with percentage change in current investment
⎛ ∂R ⎞
⎜ ⎟
R
γ R,a = ⎝ ⎠ )
⎛ ∂a ⎞
⎜ ⎟
⎝ a ⎠
Environmental uncertainty
Organization 1’s gain to performance ratio (change in profit for organization 1 for
unit change in performance)
Organization 2’s gain to performance ratio (change in profit for organization 2 for
unit change in performance)
Organization 1’s expected gain (the expected profit for organization 1; revenue less
the cost expended)
Organization 2’s expected gain (the expected profit for organization 2; revenue less
the cost expended)
System’s expected gain (the expected profit for the system comprising of
organization 1 and organization 2; revenue less the cost expended)
Organization 1’s participation rate
Organization 1’s unique prior knowledge creation efforts (includes only
investments made prior to the current project)
Organization 2’s unique prior knowledge creation efforts (includes only
investments made prior to the current project)
Performance to investment sensitivity for the organization 1’s unique prior
knowledge creation efforts (percentage change in revenue with percentage change
⎛ ∂R ⎞
⎜ ⎟
R
in unique prior knowledge creation investment δ 1 R ,q1 = ⎝ ⎠ )
⎛ ∂q1 ⎞
⎜⎜
⎟⎟
⎝ q1 ⎠
Performance to investment sensitivity for the organization 2’s unique prior
knowledge creation efforts ((percentage change in revenue with percentage change
⎛ ∂R ⎞
⎜ ⎟
R
in unique prior knowledge investment δ 2 R ,q2 = ⎝ ⎠ )
⎛ ∂q 2 ⎞
⎜⎜
⎟⎟
q
⎝ 2 ⎠
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Appendix B: Essay 2 Symbols and their Descriptions
Symbol

P
P̂
a

γ

ε
b
ρL

ρF
πˆ L
πˆ F

πˆ
t
cF
cL

φL

φF

Description

Performance due to knowledge creation investments
Expected performance
Total current knowledge creation effort(total dollar amount expended by both of the
organizations in the collaboration exclusively toward the current project)
Performance to investment sensitivity for the current knowledge creation effort
(percentage change in revenue with percentage change in current investment
⎛ ∂R ⎞
⎜ ⎟
R
γ R,a = ⎝ ⎠ )
⎛ ∂a ⎞
⎜ ⎟
⎝ a ⎠
Environmental uncertainty
Risk tolerance
Leader’s gain to performance ratio (change in profit for leader organization per unit
change in performance)
Follower’s gain to performance ratio (change in profit for follower organization per
unit change in performance)
Leader’s expected gain (the expected profit for leader organization; revenue less the
cost expended)
Follower’s expected gain (the expected profit for follower organization; revenue less
the cost expended)
System’s expected gain(the expected profit for the system comprised of both of the
organization ; revenue less the cost expended)
Leader’s participation rate
Capability of the follower to commercialize new knowledge
Capability of the leader to commercialize new knowledge
Sensitivity for the leader’s performance to its commercialization capacity (percentage
change in revenue with percentage change in leader’s commercialization capacity
⎛ ∂R ⎞
⎜ ⎟
R
ϕ L R ,c L = ⎝ ⎠ )
⎛ ∂c L ⎞
⎜⎜
⎟⎟
⎝ cL ⎠
Sensitivity for the follower’s performance to its commercialization capacity
(percentage change in revenue with percentage change in follower’s
⎛ ∂R ⎞
⎜ ⎟
R
commercialization capacity ϕ F R ,cF = ⎝ ⎠ )
⎛ ∂c F ⎞
⎜⎜
⎟⎟
⎝ cF ⎠
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Appendix C: Essay 3 Symbols and their Descriptions
Symbol

P
P̂
a

α
γF
ε
γL
b

ρL

ρF
πˆ L
πˆ F

πˆ
t
cF
cL

φL

φF

Description

Performance due to knowledge creation investments
Expected performance
Total current knowledge creation effort(total dollar amount expended by both of the
organizations in the collaboration exclusively toward the current project)
Performance saturation asymptote (limit on the performance improvements that can
occur due to knowledge created)
Follower’s performance to investment sensitivity for the current knowledge creation
effort (percentage change in revenue with percentage change in current investment
for the follower organization
Environmental uncertainty
Leader’s performance to investment sensitivity for the current knowledge creation
effort (percentage change in revenue with percentage change in current investment
for the leader organization
Risk tolerance
Leader’s gain to performance ratio (change in profit for leader organization per unit
change in performance)
Follower’s gain to performance ratio (change in profit for follower organization per
unit change in performance)
Leader’s expected gain (the expected profit for leader organization; revenue less the
cost expended)
Follower’s expected gain (the expected profit for follower organization; revenue less
the cost expended)
System’s expected gain(the expected profit for the system comprised of both of the
organization ; revenue less the cost expended)
Leader’s participation rate
Capability of the follower to commercialize new knowledge
Capability of the leader to commercialize new knowledge
Sensitivity for the leader’s performance to its commercialization capacity (percentage
change in revenue with percentage change in leader’s commercialization capacity
⎛ ∂R ⎞
⎜ ⎟
R
ϕ L R ,c L = ⎝ ⎠ )
⎛ ∂c L ⎞
⎜⎜
⎟⎟
⎝ cL ⎠
Sensitivity for the follower’s performance to its commercialization capacity
(percentage change in revenue with percentage change in follower’s
⎛ ∂R ⎞
⎜ ⎟
R
commercialization capacity ϕ F R ,cF = ⎝ ⎠ )
⎛ ∂c F ⎞
⎜⎜
⎟⎟
⎝ cF ⎠
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Appendix D: Proof Showing that both Essay 1 Values of t* are Equivalent.
Proof that Equation (14) is equivalent to Equation (15)
− jπˆ − w + ρ1 [α − (a *) ]
a*
−γ

t* =

(14)

(1 − j )πˆ − w − ρ 2 [α − (a *) ]
a*
−γ

t* = 1 +

(15)

For Equation (14) to be equivalent to Equation (15)
a * +πˆ − jπˆ − w − ρ 2 [α − (a *) ] = − jπˆ − w + ρ1[α − (a *) ]
−γ

−γ

a * +πˆ − ρ 2 [α − (a *) ] = ρ1 [α − (a *) ]
−γ

[

−γ

]

a * +πˆ = ( ρ1 + ρ 2 ) α − a *−γ or

πˆ = ( ρ1 + ρ 2 )[α − a *−γ ] − a * which is the expected system gain with the value of a that
maximizes πˆ .
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Appendix E: Explanation Clarifying Seemingly Circular Propositions in
Essay 1
Propositions

Proposition 1a: A higher risk tolerant
organization’s participation rate in
current knowledge creation efforts is
less compared to that of the lesser risk
tolerant organization.
Proposition 1b: A higher risk tolerant
organization is expected to get a
greater share of the expected system
gain.

Proposition 2: An organization with
greater bargaining power will
participate less in the current
knowledge creation effort than that
with lesser bargaining power.
Proposition 3a: The optimal value of
current knowledge creation efforts is
lower in the presence of prior
knowledge creation efforts (Scenario
2) than without prior knowledge
creation efforts (Scenario 1).
Proposition 3b: The optimal expected
system gain is higher in the presence
of prior knowledge creation efforts
(Scenario 2) than without prior
knowledge creation efforts (Scenario
1).

Essay 1
Explanation Clarifying Seemingly Circular
Propositions

The expected gain functions specify the relationship
among the parameters expected gains (for individual
organizations as well as the system), current
knowledge creation effort (investment) and
participation rate. Note that these functions do not
have a parameter of either risk tolerance or
bargaining power. These two game-theoretic factors
appear in the utility functions for the individual
organizations and for the system. The utility is a
function of expected gain, risk tolerance and
bargaining power. No relationship is assumed among
expected gain and risk tolerance or no such
relationship can be derived without considering the
conditions of optimality. Also, no relationship can be
derived among the parameters participation rate, risk
tolerance and bargaining power unless under the
conditions of optimality. Hence the Propositions 1a,
1b and 2 are not circular.
In Scenario 2, the expected gain functions specify the
relationships among the expected gain, prior
knowledge creation efforts in addition to the current
knowledge creation efforts and the participation rate.
As with Propositions 1a, 1b and 2, no relation can be
established among the expected system gain, current
knowledge creation effort, bargaining power, risk
tolerance and participation rate directly from the
expected gain functions, and utility functions, except
under the conditions of optimality. Furthermore, the
Propositions 3a, 3b and 4 are comparisons of
Scenarios 1 and 2. No assumptions are made to
suggest how the relationships among the variables
change from one scenario to the other.

Proposition 4: The participation rate
of an organization in the current
knowledge
creation
efforts
is
negatively associated with both its risk
tolerance and its bargaining power,
regardless of their prior knowledge
creation efforts.
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Appendix F: Explanation Clarifying Seemingly Circular Propositions in
Essay 2
Propositions

Proposition 1a: The equilibrium value of
current knowledge creation effort is a
concave upward function of the
performance to investment sensitivity of
current knowledge creation effort.
Proposition 1b: The equilibrium value of
current knowledge creation effort is a
concave upward function of the risk
tolerance.
Proposition
2a:
The
leader’s
participation rate is an increasing
function of the performance to
investment sensitivity of current
knowledge creation effort.

Essay 2
Explanation Clarifying Seemingly Circular
Propositions

The expected gain functions specify the
relationships among the parameters expected gain,
current knowledge creation effort, performance to
investment sensitivity and risk tolerance. The
relations among the current knowledge creation
effort, performance to investment sensitivity and
risk tolerance become evident only under
conditions of optimality.

The expected gain functions also specify the
relationship among the expected gain and
participation rate, but do not establish any direct
relationship of performance to investment
sensitivity and risk tolerance with participation
rate, except under conditions of optimality.

Proposition 2b: The equilibrium value of
the leader’s participation rate is a
convex upward function of risk
tolerance.
Proposition 3: The leader participates
and hence the collaboration exists only
L
when 2 > 1 − γb .
F2

When the model is set up, no assumption is made
with respect to the parameters that establish
conditions for the collaboration to exist. By
determining the equilibrium values, one can
identify the conditions under which the
equilibrium values hold true and thus the
collaboration exists. Hence Proposition 3 is not
circular.

Proposition 4a: The equilibrium value of
the expected system gain is a concave
upward function of performance to
investment sensitivity of current
knowledge creation effort.

The expected system gain function establishes
the relationship among the parameters expected
system gain and current knowledge creation
effort. The relationships between expected
system gain and performance to investment
sensitivity, and that between expected system
gain and risk tolerance, are established only at
the equilibrium condition.

Proposition 4b: The equilibrium value of
the expected system gain is a concave
upward function of risk tolerance.
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Appendix G: Derivation for Essay 3 Equilibrium Value of t.
Essay 3 :

Leader is characterized by decreasing marginal return function.
Follower is characterized by increasing marginal return function.

[

]

πˆ L = ρ L α − a −γ c L −φ − at
L

L

Let L3 = ρ L c L

−φ L

πˆ L = ρ Lα − L3 a

. Then

−γ L

− at

πˆ F = ρ F b a γ b c F φ b − a(1 − t )
F

F

(

Let F3 = ρ F c F

πˆ F = F3 a

γ Fb

) . Then

φF b

− a(1 − t )

πˆ = ρ Lα + F3 a γ b − L3 a −γ − a
F

L

Setting the first derivative of πˆ F to 0, we get:
∂πˆ F
= F3 (γ F b )a γ F b −1 − (1 − t ) = 0.
∂a

Let k = γ F b

F3 ka k −1 − (1 − t ) = 0
F3 ka k −1 = (1 − t )
a k −1 =

(1 − t )
or
F3 k

⎛ (1 − t )
a * = ⎜⎜
⎝ F3 k

⎞
⎟⎟
⎠

1
k −1

−γ L

1

⎛ (1 − t ) ⎞ k −1 ⎛ (1 − t ) ⎞ k −1
⎟⎟ t
⎟⎟ − ⎜⎜
πˆ L = ρ Lα − L3 ⎜⎜
F
k
F
k
⎝ 3 ⎠
⎝ 3 ⎠
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L3 (1 − t )

πˆ L = ρ Lα −

Let X =

(F3 k )

−γ L
k −1

1

(F3 k )

−γ L
k −1

−

t (1 − t )

1
k −1
1

(F3 k ) k −1

and

1
k −1

⎛
1
⎜
Let Y = ⎜
−γ
⎜ (F k ) k −L1
⎝ 3

⎞
⎟
−γ L
⎟⎟ L3 or Y = X L3
⎠

πˆ L = ρ Lα − Y (1 − t )

−γ L
k −1

− Xt (1 − t )

1
k −1

−γ

L
−1
−1
∂πˆ L
⎛−γL ⎞
⎛ 1 ⎞
= −Y ⎜
⎟(1 − t ) k −1 (−1) − X (1 − t ) k −1 − Xt ⎜
⎟(1 − t ) k −1 (− 1)
∂t
⎝ k −1⎠
⎝ k −1⎠

−γ

1

1

L
−1
−1
⎛ γ ⎞
⎛ 1 ⎞
− Y ⎜ L ⎟(1 − t ) k −1 − X (1 − t ) k −1 + Xt ⎜
⎟(1 − t ) k −1 = 0
⎝ k −1⎠
⎝ k −1⎠

1

1

(G.1)

Recall that Y = X−γL L3. Then Equation (G.1) can be written as:
−X

−γ L

−γ

L
−1
−1
⎛ γ ⎞
⎛ 1 ⎞
L3 ⎜ L ⎟(1 − t ) k −1 − X (1 − t ) k −1 + Xt ⎜
⎟(1 − t ) k −1 = 0
⎝ k −1⎠
⎝ k −1⎠

1

1

−γ

L
−1
−1
⎛ γ ⎞
⎛ 1 ⎞
−γ
Xt ⎜
⎟(1 − t ) k −1 − X L L3 ⎜ L ⎟(1 − t ) k −1 = X (1 − t ) k −1
⎝ k −1⎠
⎝ k −1⎠

1

1

Factoring out X on both sides, we get:
−γ

L
−1
−1
⎛ γ ⎞
⎛ t ⎞
−γ −1
⎟(1 − t ) k −1 − X L L3 ⎜ L ⎟(1 − t ) k −1 = (1 − t ) k −1
⎜
⎝ k −1⎠
⎝ k −1⎠

1

1

1

Factoring out (1 − t ) k −1 on both sides, we get:
X −γ L −1 L3γ L
⎛ t ⎞
−1
(1 − t )
⎟(1 − t ) −
⎜
k −1
⎝ k −1⎠
−1

t (1 − t ) − X

−γ L −1

L3γ L (1 − t )

− (γ L + k )
k −1

− (γ L + k )
k −1

= k −1

=1

(G.2)
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Let Z = X −γ L −1 L3γ L and t (1 − t ) −1 be written as − 1 + (1 − t ) −1 . Then Equation (G.2) can be
rewritten as
− 1 + (1 − t ) −1 − Z (1 − t )

− (γ L + k )
k −1

= k −1

− (γ L +1)
⎡
⎤
(1 − t ) ⎢1 − Z (1 − t ) k −1 ⎥ = k
⎣
⎦
−1

(G.3)

RHS (k) is always less than 1, since k = γ F b
1
On LHS,
>1
1− t

This implies that in order to satisfy Equation (G.3), 0 < 1 − Z (1 − t )
− (γ L + k
k −1

1- Z ( 1 − t )
(1 − t )

− (γ L + k )
k −1

<

− (γ L + k )
k −1

< 1

)

> 0 implies that

1
Z

1− k

⎛ 1 ⎞ 1+γ L
(1 − t ) < ⎜ ⎟
⎝Z⎠
1− k

⎛ 1 ⎞ 1+ γ L
t >1− ⎜ ⎟
⎝ Z ⎠
recall that Z = X −γ L −1 L3γ L and X =

(G.4)
1
1

(F3 k ) k −1

Then
1
⎞
⎛
⎜ ⎡ 1 ⎤ k −1 ⎟
Z = ⎜⎢
⎥ ⎟
⎜ ⎣ F3 k ⎦ ⎟
⎠
⎝

− γ L −1

L3γ L

− ( γ L +1 )

⎡ 1 ⎤
Z = L3γ L ⎢
⎥
⎣ F3 k ⎦

k −1
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1
1
[F3 k ]
=
Z L3γ L
⎛1⎞
⎜ ⎟
⎝Z⎠
⎛1⎞
⎜ ⎟
⎝Z⎠

1− k
1+ γ L

1− k
1+ γ L

⎛1⎞
⎜ ⎟
⎝Z ⎠

− ( γ L +1 )

k −1

− ( γ L +1 )
⎡ 1
⎤
=⎢
[F3 k ] k −1 ⎥
⎣ L3γ L
⎦

⎡ 1 ⎤
=⎢
⎥
⎣ L3γ L ⎦

1− k
1+ γ L

=

1− k
1+ γ L

1− k
1+ γ L

[F3 k ] recall that k = γ

F

b

F3 γ F b

(L 3 γ L )

1− γ F b
1+ γ L

⎛
⎜ Fγ b
3 F
Now, Equation (G.4) can be rewritten as t > 1 − ⎜
1− γ F b
1+ γ L
⎜
⎝ (L3γ L )
for t.

⎞
⎟
⎟ , which serves as a lower bound
⎟
⎠

From Equation (G.3), we can compute one possible expression for t3*. Substituting γFb for k,
Equation (G.3) can be written as:
− (γ L +1)
⎤
⎡
(1 − t ) −1 ⎢1 − Z (1 − t ) k −1 ⎥ = γ F b .
⎦
⎣
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Appendix H: Explanation Clarifying Seemingly Circular Propositions in
Essay 3
Propositions

Proposition
1:
The
current
knowledge creation effort is an
increasing function of the follower’s
performance to investment sensitivity
across the values of leader’s
performance
to
investment
sensitivity.
Proposition
2:
The
leader’s
participation rate is lower for higher
values of follower’s performance to
investment sensitivity across the
values of leader’s performance to
investment sensitivity.

Essay 3
Explanation Clarifying Seemingly Circular
Propositions

The expected gain function establishes the
relationship among the parameters expected gain,
current knowledge creation effort and participation
rate. However, the relationship between the current
knowledge creation effort and the follower’s
performance to investment sensitivity is
established only under the conditions of
optimality. Hence Proposition 1 is not circular.
Similarly, the relationship between the leader’s
participation rate and the follower’s performance
to investment sensitivity is established only under
the conditions of optimality. Hence, Proposition 2
is not circular.

Proposition 3: The collaboration
exists only when the solution to the
equation
(γ L +1)
⎡
⎤
−1
(1 − t *) ⎢1 − Z (1 − t*) 1−γ F b ⎥ = γ F b is
⎢⎣
⎥⎦
F3γ F b
.
between 1 and 1 −
1−γ F b
(L3γ L ) 1+γ L

When the model is set up, the only assumption
made with regard to the leader’s participation rate
is that it is between 0 and 1. Thus, no assumption
is made with respect to the existence of any other
lower bound for the leader’s participation rate t,
than 0. Proposition 3 specifies such a lower bound
for the leader’s participation rate and hence is not
circular.

Proposition 4a: The equilibrium
value of leader’s expected gain
monotonically increases as a
function of follower’s performance to
investment sensitivity across the
values of leader’s performance to
investment sensitivity.

The expected system gain functions for the leader
and follower organizations establish the
relationship among the parameters expected
system gain and current knowledge creation effort.
However, the relationships between the leader’s
expected system gain and the follower’s
performance to investment sensitivity, and that
between follower’s expected system gain and the
follower’s performance to investment sensitivity,
are established only at the equilibrium condition.
Hence, Propositions 4a and 4b are not circular.

Proposition 4b: The equilibrium
value of follower’s expected gain
monotonically decreases as a
function of follower’s performance to
investment sensitivity across the
values of leader’s performance to
investment sensitivity.

151

Proposition 5a: The relation between
the equilibrium value of expected
system gain and the follower’s
performance to investment sensitivity
is non-monotonic for lower values of
the
leader’s
performance
to
investment sensitivity.
Proposition 5b: The equilibrium
value of expected system gain
monotonically increases with the
follower’s performance to investment
sensitivity for higher values of the
leader’s performance to investment
sensitivity.

The expected system gain function establishes the
relationship among the parameters expected
system gain and current knowledge creation effort.
The relationship between expected system gain
and follower’s performance to investment
sensitivity is established only at the equilibrium
condition. Moreover, the Proposition 5a is
interesting because it unravels the effect that the
leader’s performance to investment sensitivity has
on the relationship between the expected system
gain and the follower’s performance to investment
sensitivity. Hence, Propositions 5a and 5b are not
circular.
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